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INTRODUCTION 
National defense organization is frequently regarded 
as a technical matter by many officers of the Armed Forces. 
Yet a careful examination of the history of such organiza-
tion, shows that the matter is at least as much political 
as military in nature. Therefore, Congress is vitally 
important in determining what the organization will be. 
The degree to which Congress has participated in the 
determination of Armed Force organization has varied over 
the years. At one time early in our history, Congress 
determined the assignment of every man in the Army. At 
other times Congress determined the detailed Tables of 
organization of all Army units, including individual 
companies. In recent years Congress has prescribed in 
less detail, confining itself to setting overall policies. 
In 194?, when Congress adopted a new organization, 
the responsibility for all military matters was placed 
in a single Armed Services Committee in each House. This 
year is the sta.rting point for this study. The period 
discussed extends through the 1952 Congressional Session. 
During this six years, a wide variety o~ conditions 
existed. In 194? the country was disarming. In 1949 and 
1950 peace time arms were being built up. After 1950, a 
war was in progress. Politically, both Democrats and 
Republicans controlled the Congress at different times. 
The legislative activities of the period also varied. 
The Unification of the Armed Forces, the Organization of 
the Army and Air Force, Selective Service, and Universal 
Military Training, were all matters for Congressional 
action. 
iii 
This examination of the Armed Services Committees 
extends into several fields. ~e first chapter covers the 
responsibilities of the Committees, their organizational 
capabilities, and their key personalities. In the second 
chapter the goal has been to determine the motivations of 
the Congressmen i~ dealing with defense organization. The 
third chapter is devoted to a comparison of the Congression-
al attitudes toward the different services. Since it is 
sometimes alleged that the Congressional system is particu-
larly susceptible to lobbying action, an examination of 
lobbies, their activities, and their effect on defense 
legisls tion is undertaken in the fourth chapter. The fifth 
chapter is devoted to certain conclusions. 
1 
CHAPTER I 
THE COMMITTEES AND THE MEMBERS 
The United States Navy sometimes has been referred to 
as "Mr. Vinson's Navy." 
~~. Vinson's position. 
The words are revealing because of 
The gentleman is not an Admiral. 
Neither is he a Secretary of the Navy, a President, or any 
other member of the Executive Branch of the Government. 
He is a Congressman. From 1931 to 1947 he was Chairman 
of the House Naval Affairs Committee and from 1949 to 1953 
he headed the House Armed Services Committee. 
Why is a Congressman important in forging our Armed 
Forces, an agency of the Executive Branch? He is important 
because Congress, under the Constitution, is charged with 
the responsibility of raising an army and a navy. 
vVhen our forefathers wrote the Constitution, they di-
vided the responsibility for the Armed Forces between the 
Legislative and Executive Branches of Government, just as 
they divided other authority and responsibility. To the 
President they gave supreme command, but to Congress they 
gave the purse strings and other authority. From that 
day to this Congress has been an important factor in 
defense matters. 
The basic responsibilities and authorities of Congress 
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are set forth in the Constitution under Article I. Those 
bearing on defense are given below. 
"Sect. 5 • 
••• Each House may determine the Rules 
of its Proceedings, ••• 
"Sect. 7. All bills for raising Revenue shall 
originate in the House of Representatives; but the Sen-
ate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other 
Bills •••• 
"Sect. 8. The Congress shall have Power to ••• 
provide for the common Defense and General Welfare of 
the United States; ••• 
To deelare War, ••• 
To raise and support Armies, but no 
Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a long-
er Term than two years; 
To provide and maintain a Navy; 
To make Rules for the Government and 
Regula tion of the land and naval Forces; 
To provide for calling forth the Mili-
tia to execute the Laws of' the Union, suppress Insur-
rections and repel Invasions; 
To provide for organizing, arming, and 
disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part 
of them as may be employed in the Service of the United 
States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appoint-
ment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the 
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Con-
gress; 
To exercise exclusive Legislation in 
all Cases whatsoever, ••• over all Places purchased by 
the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which 
the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, 
Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings; --And 
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To make all Laws which shall be neces-
sary and proper for carrying i nto Execution the fore-
going powers, and all other Powers vested by this Con-
stitution in the Government of the United States, or 
in any Department or Officer thereof. 
"Sect. 9. • •• 
No Money shall be drawn from the Treas-
ury, but in consequence of Appropriations made by Law; 
and a regular Sta tement and Account of the Receipts and 
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published 
from time to time •••• 
"Sect. 10. • •• 
No State shall, without the Consent of 
Congress, ••• keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of 
Peace, ••• or engage in War, unless actually invaded, 
or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay." 
"Articles in addition to, and Ammendment of ••• 
"Art. II. A well regula ted Militia, being neces-
sary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." 
The military responsibilities cited are only a part of 
the Congressional effort. To obta in sound judgement on the 
diverse problems presented in this and other fields, Congress 
has adopted the Committee system. Most of the legislative 
work is done in these standing comraittees. In the legisla-
tive reorganization of 1947 Armed Services Committees were 
formed in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.1 
1. It should be noted tha t Congress achieved unification in 
military matters before the Ar med Forces themselves. 
See The Theor¥ and Practice of Americ an Government by 
Carl Brent Sw1sher, Riverside Press, 1951, p 195, for 
discussion of the influence of Congressional organiza-
tion on Armed Forces organizati on. 
The powers and responsibilities of the two committees 
are included in the rules of the two chambers. In the 
House of Representatives eleven areas of responsibility 
for the Armed Services Committee are established. 
"1. Common Defense generally. 
2. The War Department and Military Establish-
ment generally. 
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3. The Navy Department and the Naval Establish-
ment generally. 
4. Soldier's and Sailor's homes. 
5. Pay, promotion, retirement, and benefits and 
privileges of members of the Armed Forces. 
6. Selective Service. 
• 
7. Size and Composition of the Army and Navy. 
a. Forts, Arsenals, htllitary reservations and 
Navy Yards. 
9. Ammunition Depots. 
• 
10. Conservation, Development, and use of Naval 
petroleum and Shale reserves. 
11. Strategic and Critical materials necessary 
for common defense. 
D 
12. Scientific research and development in support 
of the armed services."2 
The Senate Committee's responsibilities parallel those 
of the House, except that responsibility for the Panama Canal 
is added. 3 The Committees also are charged with exercising 
2. Rules of the House of Representatives of United States, 
82nd Congress, USGPO, l951, p 326 ff. 
3. Senate Manual, 80th Congress, 1st Session, USGPO, 1947, 
Senate Doc. #11, p 22. 
continuous watchfulness over the execution of any laws 
within their field of subject matter. 4 
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Clearly, the Armed Services Committees have large 
responsibilities for the common defense. Their ability to 
handle them depends on several items. The ability of the 
personnel, the organizational ability to arrive at rational 
decisions, and the Committee's effectiveness in securing 
the implementation of the decisions are all important. 
Since no organization can be more capable than the 
people that make it up, the selection of CoL~nittee person-
nel is a vital function. Congress delegates de facto 
authority to select personnel to the parties. To avoid par-
ty fights, preference is customarily given to individuals 
in accordance with their seniority in Congress. Occasion-
ally, the Cor~ittee Chairman may attempt to select indi-
viduals; but, in general, assignment in accordance with 
ability is the exception, not the rule. 5 
Hit or miss as this system of Committee assignment may 
be, the results within the Armed Services Committees have 
4. House Rules, ££• cit., p 494. 
5. Supposedly Chairman Vinson selected the members of his 
House Committee to a certain extent, See Newsweek, Mar. 
28, 1949. Two specific examples of this 1n relation to 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee occurred in 1919 
and 1947. See The Senate Foreign Relations Conwittee 
by Eleanor E. Dennison, Stanford University Press, 1942, 
p 9, and The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, ed. 
by Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr, Houghton Mifflin Co, 1952, 
p 333. 
been fortunate. By and large, some of the most respected 
men in either house have been assigned to the Committees. 
The men discussed in the last part of this chapter have 
gained enviable reputations both within the Congress and 
in the nation as a whole. 
Quite apart from the Congressional reputations of 
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these legislators is the question of their knowledge of 
defense matters. Although the members of the Armed Services 
Committees bring to their initial assignment little more 
knowledge than the other legislators, the Committees, as a 
whole, have considerable background in military matters. In 
the House the Committee is composed of many of the same men 
year after year. Thus, six members of the Committee con-
sidering the Universal Military Training bill in 1951 had 
been dealing with defense legislation since before World 
War II. In 1951 all but one member of the previous Committee 
was reelected. Although the Senate Committee shows less con-
tinuity than the House group, it also contains a number of 
men who have gained considerable knowledge through experience. 
Another point in the consideration of Committee person-
nel is the selection of the Chairmen. Since the Chairmen 
exercise large powers over legislation, their selection by 
seniority has long been an object of attack by critics of 
Congressional organization. 6 It is certainly true that an 
obstinate and obstructive Committee Chairman is capable or 
wrecking errorts to achieve constructive legislation. 
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In the face of this possibility it is particularly 
rortunate that the Chairmen of the Armed Services Co1mnittees 
were responsible and capable individuals during the critical 
years in question. As a result of the example set by these 
leaders, defense legislation has been removed from the field 
of partisan politics within the Committees. The Chairmen 
have worked in close cooperation with the members of the 
Defense Department on many bills. Their judgement of what 
could be achieved usually has been sufficiently accurate to 
ensure that their bills were not chopped to pieces on the 
floor of Congress. 7 
The Committee staffs should be mentioned also. One of 
the most important steps in the legislative reorganization of 
6. Congress on Trial by James M. Burns, Harper and Bros., 
N.Y., 1949, p 57 ff, is but one example. It is highly 
improbable that this system will be changed in e.ny way 
since it seems to satisfy the Congressmen, except cer-
tain of the young members. Neither the younger members 
nor the critics have the power to force a change and 
the older members will not since the system works to 
their advantage. 
7. This adjusting of administra·ti ve desirability to legisla-
tive reality is a prime political task of the legislators. 
In many ways the statue of the individual legislator is 
judged by his ability in this field. ~or example, this 
is one of abilities claimed as Senator Vandenberg's 
strong points. Vandenberg, ££• cit., p 325. For examples 
or this ability notice the 1949 Senate Unification Hear-
ings and the 1951 House U£,fl Hearings. 
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1946 was the strengthening of the Committee staffs and the 
Legislative Reference Service. The Armed Services Committees 
have taken advantage of the provisions for a staff to obtain 
the assistance of individuals of capacity and reputation. 8 
These gentlemen have been of considerable assistance to the 
9 legislators. Equally, the Legislative Reference Service 
has been used to advantage on a number of occasions to pro-
vide background studies for specific legislation.10 
In short, the Armed Services Committees present a 
favorable picture from the standpoint of personnel. 
The ability of the Committees to reach rational deci-
sions depends on several factors. The Committee must secure 
information in order to reach a conclusion, which in turn, 
must be fitted into a framework of other legislation. 
a. The selection of the staff is extremely important. A 
staff member has considerable power since much informa-
tion passes through his hands and the legislator is 
forced to view many things through the eyes of the 
staff. An incompetent or prejudiced staff member 
could twist the legislator's views. 
9. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Armed 
Servicesf House of Representatives, on Army Organization 
Bill of 950, USGPO, hereafter eited as l950 Army Hearings, 
Dur~ng the hearings, John Blandf ord, the staff assistant, 
assisted in the quest ioning, suggested new lines of 
questioning, and in general was very active. 
10. Two examples are background studies on unification and 
the Army Reserve Bill. See Hea .. ings before a subcommittee 
of the Committee on Armed Servi'C}es, u. S. Senate, 82nd 
Gong, on HR 5426, hereafter cJ.ted as Senate Reserve Hear-
ings, p 31?, and Re~ort and Anal ysis by the Le~J.slatJ.ve 
Reference Service LJ.brary of Congress on HR 23 9(80th 
Gong), USGPO, l94?. 
Securing the information has not been a critical 
problem for the Armed Services Comml ttees. They have held 
long hearings on various controvers i al subjects. Here the 
9 
services, government officials, congressmen, and interested 
parties outside the government, have been able to present 
their views. When necessary, these hearings have been held 
in executive session. During Secret ary Forrestal's tenure, 
the legislators were frequently con~·ul ted. From time to time 
the military components of the serv · ce have looked to Con-
gress for succor.11 
Whether the Committees have reached sound decisions 
from the information presented to t hem, is a question only 
history can answer. The Committees have had to rationalize 
some rather divergent views and secure suitable compromises 
on a number of occasions. This in :itself is a political 
feat of no small importance. As suggested in a study of the 
UMT problem in a later chapter, the Committees are frequently 
ahead of the remainder of Congress i n their understanding 
of defense problems. A final evalua tion of the Committees' 
efforts cannot be made at this time. 
11. Secretary Forrestal's efforts along this line appear 
throughout his book, The Forrest al Diaries, ed. by 
W~lter Millis, Viking Press, 1951, hereafter cited as 
Forrestal. Examples of the Services going to the Con-
gress for assistance show in such items a s the B-36 
Hearings, the efforts to achieve a 70 group Air Force, 
and many others . See Chapter 3 . 
10 
The problem of reaching a rational decision on an in-
dividual question is only a segment of the picture. A 
network of such answers must be achieved. In this matter 
of evaluating the total situation, the entire Congress is 
weak. There are numerous suggestions for methods of im-
provement, but few of them are applicable to the problems 
of the Armed Services Committees in considering defense 
12 
organization. 
In the House this problem is acute due to the large 
size of the Committee. As a solution, Chairman Vinson 
organized a Policy Subcommittee, in addition to four work-
ing subcommittees and certain special groups. This policy 
group, which included the ranking majority and minority 
12. Congress and Foreign Policy by Robert A. Dahl, Har-
court, Brace, and Co., 1950, hereafter cited as Dahl, 
p 158 ff, discusses a number of such plans in relation 
to foreign policy. In general such plans involve a 
national institute for policy analysis, party staffs or 
some similar organization. Such staffs would be in-
appropriate to assist the Armed Services Committees for 
several reasons. Military organization matters are too 
low level to be susceptible to such studies which are 
suited to an analysis of national objectives. ~lilitary 
matters should not be interjected into party matters 
for obvious reasons. Unlike most other fields of en-
deavor, there is only one source of professional com-
petency available, the ar.med forces themselves. Lastly, 
evaluations in modern war rest on technical research 
that a policy evaluation group outside the government 
would not have access to. The B-36 hearings are a 
prime example of the inability of an outside group to 
evaluate technical details. See Hearings before the 
Committee on Armed Services, Unification and Strategy, 
8lst Congress, 1st Session, USGPO, 1949, hereafter 
cited as B-36 Hearings. 
members of each of the working subcommittees, formed an 
inner council with much experience in defense matters.13 
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To the extent that the problem can be solved without staff 
assistance this group tied the various defense decisions 
together and related them to the political situation in 
Congress. In the Senate the linking of one decision to an-
other must be done informally. 
The Armed Services Committees' decisions require im-
plementation to be effective. The agreement of the remain-
der of Congress must be secured first and funds are needed 
in many cases. The Committees also supervise the opera-
tions of the Defense Department in carrying out the bills. 
The agreement of the remainder of Congress usually 
presents no problem. However, the House Committee did re-
ceive a rebuff on the Universal Iviili tary Training measure 
in 1952. Since the Committee did not have its normal una-
nimity on this measure, this is not altogether surpris-
ing.l4 
-----------------------------------------------------------13. 
14. 
Organization of the ~~med Services Committeef House 
of Representatives, Jan. 4, 1951, USGPO, l95 • This 
group included the ranking four members of each party 
plus Chairman Vinson. 
Newsweek, Mar. 28, 1949, commented that Chairman Vin-
son usually managed to report bills unanimously. In 
this case the committee reported the bill by a 27-7 
vote. Army-Navy-Air Force Journal, Feb. 9. 
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I n securing fund s t h e Ar med Services Commi t tees are a t 
more of a disa dvantage. Congress ha s divided monetary 
powers from legisla tive powers. Milita ry legislation tha t 
required funds for liaplementation, f or example, the 70 group 
Air :B,orce progr am , must be passed t wice in effect •15 The 
Senate Committee is in a more f avorable position in this re-
spect t han the House . Senator Bridges, the r anking Repub-
lican member of t he Appropria tions Committee, is e member of 
the Ar med Services Comn1ittee. In addition, Sena te rules prG-
vide tha t certain members of the Ar med Services Committee 
will sit with t he Appropriation Committee when defense ap-
propria tions are being considered.16 The House Committee 
does not have t h is a dvantage and must overcome this diff i-
culty through persistence. The matter is a continuing 
organi zational problem. 
The Committees do not drop t h e matters when t h e l aws 
are pa ssed. They are active in their supervision of the 
15. The Purse and the Sword by Elia s Huzar, Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1950, is B. study of the entire area of 
Armed Forces appropria tions. He shows an apprecia tion 
of the effect of appropria tions on policy but his con-
clusions appear unsound when he sta tes t hat t h e Appro-
priations Committee should t ake a s tronger hand in 
making policy p 398 r f. In Progr am Budgeting : Theory 
and Pr actice by Frederick C. J11osher, Public Administra -
tion Service, 1954, I\'Iosher questions t he accuracy of 
Huzar' s deductions i n t his also. 
16. Sena te Manual, 2.£· cit., p22. 
services. In the Senate, the Johnson Preparedness Sub-
committee has conducted a series of investigations of the 
Armed Services to check efficiency of operations. Unlike 
many Senate investigations, this one has achieved a good 
17 
reputation by its constructive approach. 
The legislators' responsibilities are large. The 
structure in which they endeavor to carry out these re-
sponsibilities is less than perfect. What of the men 
themselves? 
13 
During the period under discussion, the House Committee 
Chairmanship rested in the hands of two men, Representatives 
Andrews of New York and Vinson of Georgia. 
Mr. Andrews was chairman of the Committee during 1947 
and 1948. The key piece of legislation during that period, 
the unification bill, did not come to his Committee but 
Andrews was instrumental in obtaining passage of the selec-
tive service bill in 1948. I~. Andrews was a lawyer. He 
had won a Distinguished Service Cross in the Army during 
World War I and had been a member of Congress since 1931. 
He died shortly after his retirement in 1948.18 
Mr. Andrews was succeeded by Carl Vinson of Georgia~ 
17. Current Biography, Jan. 1951. The House Committee 
assigned Mr. J. W. Courtney as special investigator on 
National Defense Matters. A-N-AF Journal, Vol.LXXXVIII, 
p 631. 
18. Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-
1949,· USGPO, 1950, p 785, and Forrestal, 2£• £11., 
p 386, 398, 427. 
Mr. Vinson was first elected to Congress in 1914 and has 
served continually ever since. Before World War II he 
was instrumental in building up the Navy. Renowned for 
getting what he wants for national defense, Chairman Vin-
son runs his Committee with an iron hand. Since 1948, 
1.4 
he has switched his attention from the Navy to the Air 
Force. He has expressed the thought, "As I have studied 
the military situation of the country, I am driven aga in 
and again to the conclusion that we will be gambling with 
our national existence if we do not provide funds for a 
great Air Force."19 
Several other Committee members also were importe.nt. 
On the Democratic side, Illir. Overton Brooks ranked next to 
Mr. Vinson. An overseas veteran from World War I, Mr. 
Brooks was more favorably disposed towards the Army than 
some of his colleagues. The hearings he conducted on the 
Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 were a model of construe-
tive group effort. r~. Kilday, who was chairman of the 
subcommittee that considered the Army Organization Bill in 
1950, has stated that a military career is the finest a 
19. Newsweek, Mar. 28, 1949. 
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college graduate can select. Mr. Sassecer, like Mr. Kilday, 
has been a Congre~sman since 1939. He came to the Committee 
from the old Naval Affairs Committee and observed, with dis-
tress, the heavy land of Senator Johnson in 1949. Mr. Dur-
ham, who served i n t he Navy during World War I, rounded out 
the Democratic side of the 1951 Pol icy Subcommittee. 20 
Representative Short became the ranking member on the 
Republican side f ollowing the retirement of Mr. Andrews. 
Mr. Short was a t eacher and a Methodist Minister before en-
tering politics. A long time opponent of the UMT policy, 
he led the opposi·· ion to that measure on the floor in 1952. 
In this effort he had the support of another key Republican 
Committee meillber, Representative Leslie Arends. Mr. Arends, 
who was the Repub: ican Vfuip of the House, also opposed the 
measure on the fl 1oor. Representative Sterling Cole, in 
addition to servi:ng on the Armed Services Committee, was a 
key figure on the Atomic Energy Committee. The other member 
of the 1951 Polio· Subcommittee was Representative Shafer, 
. 21 
a member of Congress sJ.nce 1937. 
The Senate C mmittee had three Chairmen during the 
period, Chan Gurney, Millard Tydings, a nd Richard Russell. 
20. Biographical i nformation is drawn from Biographical 
Directory,~· cit., Current Biography, and conclusions 
drawn from various hearings indicated in bibliography. 
21. Ibid. 
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Senator Gurney, a World War I Army veteran, like Chairman 
Vinson in the HOUfle, has a long record of fighting for pre-
:paredness legisla1;ion. Before World War II, he fought for 
the draft extension in 1940, against the Committee Chairman 
of the Military A:1:'fairs Committee, who was opposing President 
Roosevelt. In 19 ~ 7 he fought excessive economy cuts being 
made in the Armed Forces. In 1948 he was instrumental in 
guiding the Select ive Service Legislation. 22 
Mr. Gurney was succeeded in 1949 by Senator Tydings, 
a lawyer with an 4.,xtremely distinguished World War II 
record. Chairman Tydings was known for his examining in 
committee and cool judgement. When the House balked on the 
1949 unification J easure, he assisted the President in 
23 bringing the oppo. ing Congressmen i nto line. 
The third Chairman, Richard Russell of Georgia, has 
been one of the k y political figures of the Democratic 
party. On the Se::1a te Committee he has adopted a calm 
22. Ibid. S?e al o Forrestal, ~· cit., various :pagings 
but part1cula: ly p 447-8. 
23. Ibid. Mr. Ty ings had the most distinguished military 
record of any of the legislators, having risen from 
Pvt. to Lt. Col. in two years. He was awarded the nsc, 
DSM, and nume: ous foreign decorations. In 1949 he 
assisted in t : e coercion of the House Committee by 
announcing that, if the unification measure did not 
pass the Hous , the House sponsored pay raise would not 
pass the Senat e. Fortunately, for the members of the 
mi l itary servi ce, both bills passed. See N.Y. Times 
:f'.rqn .June to August, 1949. 
approach, refusing to be upset. During the General Mac-
Arthur hearings i n 1951, his unprejudiced approach and 
treatment of wi tn~3sses won respect. 24 
1? 
Of the other Democratic senators, Senator Byrd is well 
known for his int~rest in economy. His concisely stated 
views were not i g::10red. Senator Lyndon Johnson, who joined 
the Committee in : 949, although a freshman senator, had con-
siderable experience in the House. By 1951 his views were 
gaining importanc e and his Preparedness Subcommittee did a 
great deal of good work. 25 
On the Republican side Senator Knowland was growing in 
political stature in the Republican party. Senator Salton-
stall, like Senator Russell, was noteworthy for his calm 
unbiased approach in seeking information. Senator Bridges 
was important due to his powerful position ·within the party 
and his position on the Appropriations Committee. 26 
Before passing on the considera tion of the actual en-
deavors of the Armed Services Commit tees in the period 1947-
53, a word of comment is in order. 
The responsib i lities of the Committees are great. The 
Constitution has made Congress responsible for providing 
24. Ibid. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Ibid. 
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for defense and Congress has delegated, in large part, the 
authority to carry out tha t responsibility to the Armed 
Services Co~nittee . Individuals, such as Mr. Vinson, have 
taken this respons ibility seriously, as will be seen in the 
succeeding chapter . 
Congressiona1 machinery is not entirely adequate to 
meet these respon:dbilities. In the recent past the 
strength of the Committee members has overcome some of 
the inadequacies. There is no guarantee that this will 
occur in the futu:~·e. 
These two thoughts should form the basis for consid-
eration of the remaining chapters. 
19 
CHAP TER Il 
TJ:::E OVERA.LL -~-TTITUDES 
Congressmen, like the rest of us, have certain pictures 
in their minds. ~ I:hese i mages, built up over t h e years, form 
a framework around which they think . 1 
To understan11 military legislation and its development, 
the student needs to perceive this :motivating framework. 
VIithout this perc eption the decisions of the Ar med Services 
Committees are a naze of disorganization. 
A goal of ma ,j or i mportance, in the minds of t he Ar med 
Services Committeemen, is the need to secure a sound defens e. 
This responsibili +y is not fulfilled, a s they see it, merely 
by making appropri a tions.la Aggressive a ction is required to 
insure that the o~jective is a tta i ned . The words of Chairman 
Vinson , referring t o the Army, illustrate this feeling. 
11I am j us t worried a s to how we can carry out our 
Constitution9l Re spons ibilities to provide and maintain 
an Army if we haven't any authority to legislate and we 
delegate all the authority to the Secretary of the Ar my 
to run the e stablishm.ent under rules and regula tions a s 
he sees fit and t he only2pl a ce that Congress appears is t ha t of appr opriations." 
1. Dshl, ~· cit _. , p 17 ff, has a good anal ysis of the effect 
of' background. on Congressional a ttitudes, ].)articularly in 
reference to fo~eign policy. 
la. Swisher, 212.• c i t., Swi sher coi11I:1ents t hat t h e Ar med 
Services Committees more t han any other a ssume a 
proprietary t:=. ttitude towards their charges. 
2. 1950 Ar my HeEri n gs, ££• cit., p 6025. 
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Lest such sentiments be considered empty words, it is well 
to consider some of the politically unpopular measures, 
such as Universal Military Training, that the Committees 
have backed in their efforts to secure an efficient defense 
organization. 
The Armed Se: vices Committees are almost as interested 
in economy as in :Jlilitary efficiency. With military ex-
penses taking so large a share of the national budget, this 
is hardly surprising. Nevertheless, it is a vital corrol-
lary to the quest for a sound defense. Military expendi-
tures are generally regarded as wasteful--in other than 
time of war. 3 To secure favorable consideration for the 
needs of the services from the remainder of Congress, the 
Committees must be able to show positive action on economy 
measures. Thus, both efficiency and economy are necessary 
goals for the Armed Services Committees. 
Unfortunately certain preconceived notions of the 
Congressmen are cbstacles in the quest for efficiency and 
economy. Much of' this negative approach stems from the 
fear of militarism that has been present in this coQDtry 
since the early d.ays. Today, that fear takes the form of 
reaction against the general staff concept and the 
3. · Forrestal, ~~ . cit • , p 446. Sen a tor T~ft tol~ Secretary 
Forrestal thr:.t Congress had a general J.mpressJ.on of 
extravagance in the Armed Services since there was 
nothing with which to compare them in civilian life. 
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reluctance to gra1 t top authority i n defense matters to any 
single i ndividual ., vrhether civilian or ra.ili tary. 4 The dis-
taste for an overall Chief of Staff for the Ar med Services 
is a combination of both these feelings. 
A second obstacle to the legisla tors' efforts is 
Congres s ional dis·trust of the Executive Branch of Government 
and its officials . 5 Competition between Legislative and 
E::x:ecuti ve Br anche:3 has always been present. I t was perhaps 
stronger after 1945 in reaction to the use of executive 
pow~rs from 1933 ·o 1945. 
The above at· itudes are basically a reflection of 
att itudes held by the remainder of Congress, modified 
4. The "general t3taff" concept is f requently misunderstood 
and confused ·.vt th the German example of a staff. The 
word "general' refers to the scope of military respon-
sibilities ra her than any rank. It is used as the 
antithesis of the word "special." The "staff" concept 
is an accepte i administrative t erm used to differentiate 
between those with only advisory and planning respon-
sibilities an d the co~nander who bears operational 
responsibility . In the United States Army assignn1ent to 
general staff work is for a limited period of time and 
carries no special privileges or authority with it. 
Such officers arrange the deta i l s to i mplement the de-
cisions of their civilian superi ors. The Army General 
Staff was founded following the mismanagement of the 
Spanish American v\far. For an account see National 
Security and :the Genera l Staff by Ma jor General Otto L. 
Nelson, Jr., I nf antry Journal Pr ess, 1946. 
5. Dahl, 2J2· cit. , p 205, comments that "the stark principle 
of sepa r atiOn of powers is suspi cion: Suspicion of the 
President by Congress, of Congre ss by the President, of 
both by the electorate." 
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somewhat by the Committeemen's increased knowledge of 
military matters. They form the background for the Commit-
tee's consideration of legislation. 
The effect o:r this framework wa.s particularly apparent 
in three areas; t he unification of t he Armed Forces, the 
organization of t he Army, and the or ganization of reserve 
components. Each of these areas wi l l be examined in turn. 
UNIFICATION 
The concept of a single integrated armed force is an 
6 
old one. It rec 9ived new emphasis , however, during World 
War II when combat operations emphas; ized the necessity for 
close coordinatio:~l in modern war. The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS) and a number of other ne,w organizational struc-
7 tures were outgrovnhs of this need. 
As the war d: .. ew to a close, a s eries of studies was 
made to determine the postwar organi zation of our military 
forces. In 1945 ·the Army and Navy presented their respec-
tive plans to the Senate Military Af fairs Committee. In 
general terms, th e Army (and Air For ce) plan called for a 
6. A good study •J f' the entire history of' unification is 
Unification o the Armed Forces by Lawrence J. Legere 
Jr., an unpub:: ished study of' th e Office o:f the Chie:f 
of Military Hi story. 
7. The JCS duri ng the war was composed o:f the Chief of 
Sta:ff to the :. resident, the Army Chief of Staff, Chief 
of Naval Operations, and Commanding General Army Air 
Forces. A number of planning agencies operated under 
this group. 
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single Defense Depar tment, a general staff and chief of 
8 
staff. The Navy plan, which had been developed by Mr. 
Ferdinand Eberstadt for Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, 
called for separat e Army and Navy departments, linked by a 
series of committe es including the J'CS. 9 A second group of 
coiDillittees, headed by the National Security Council, would 
coordinate the mil itary ef:f"ort with other aspects of 
national policy. 
In 1946 Pres:tdent Truman backed a bill basically re-
flecting the Army concept. This bil l was considered favor-
ably by the Senatt:! Military Affairs Committee but died be-
fore the Senate's Naval Affairs Comndttee. In May, Senator 
Walsh, of the Sena te Naval Committee , and Representative 
Vinson, of the House Naval Committee , wrote to Secretary 
For1:.estal, commen·t ing in part: 
''Any col promise which results from a conference by 
the War and J~avy Departments which does not embody most 
of the views of those members of Congress who have made 
a study of t h e importance of s e,a-air power in our 
national deft~nse structure and which in general does 
not conform 1~th the views expr essed in this letter 
would not in our opinion be in the best interests of 
the United S·tates.niO 
8. Re;port and Analysis by the Legi slative Reference Service, 
.2J2.• cit., This source contains t he evolution of the var-
ious plans and. analyses the key points of each plan. 
9. Ibid. Also s ee Forrestal, .2J2.• g it., pps 63, 87, and 114. 
10. Re;port of Legi slative Reference Service, ~· cit. 
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During the r emainder of 1946, the Army and Navy sought 
a compromise, and by the end of the year, agreement was an-
nounced. This agreement adopted the various coordinating 
conm1ittees of the Eberstadt plan but provided for a separate 
Air Force (not ineluding Naval Air) and a single Department 
of Defense, headed by a Secretary with limited powers.ll 
A bill to this eff ect wa s transmitted to Congress by the 
President in 1947 . 
The Senators considering the bill in 1947 set their 
sights on two obj ectives. 
1. Optimum efficiency of military operations and 
integrations with other agencies and departments, 
2. Maximum economy of money, men and materie1.12 
Unfortunately, fear of militarism and distrust of the 
:Executive Branch of Government were intervening obstacles. 
11. In addition to the proposed bill part of the agreement 
between the A:1~my and Navy was contained in an Ex:ecuti ve 
Order setting forth the functions of the various ser-
vices. This was designed to protect the functions of 
the Marines and Naval aviation from infringement and 
was to be pub: ished concurrently with the enactment of 
the bill. On: y the Executive Branch thought the powers 
of the Secretary of Defense were ''limited." In the opin-
ion of Congre ss the official was a potential dictator. 
12. Report of Co~~ittee on Armed Services on SR 758, 80th 
Cong., p 3. Consideration by the personnel of the 
Armed Service Committees of the unification bill in 
1947 was conf "ned to the Senate. In the House the bill 
was referred 'to the Committee on Expenditures in the 
Executive Bra:1ch, headed by Rep. Hoffman who was strong-
ly opposed to the bill. This nearly killed the bill but 
the Committee brought the bill to the floor over Hoff-
man's objections and succeeded in passing it. 
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The proposed Secretary of Defense would occupy a higher 
pinnacle of mili t e1r y power than any individual, other than 
the President, ever previously had mounted. To many Senators 
this was dis t inctl y disturbing a s it represented potential 
militarism. Senator s Byrd, Bridges, and Robertson were par-
ticularly concerned about this question.13 The words of Sen-
ator Bridges indiea te the mixed emotions the bill aroused. 
"I woul< l ike to see as many definite restrictions 
written into the bill a s possible. After all you are 
legislating with reference to the safety and security 
of this na tion--and, if this na tion goes the world 
goes--and, I do not want to build an open ro ad in that 
direction. I want to get the objective. I want a 
unification i f that is the word. I like that better 
than merger nnd I like it better than integr a tion, but 
I want to se •3 a s many restrictions as possible because 
I do not know in a period of years what kind of men are 
going to be : .. resident. I do not know what kind of' men 
will be appo: nted to the super Secretary job.nl4 
Most of the ea r ly witnesses f'avored limited powers for 
t he Secretary of' Defense but Under Secretary of the Army 
Royall stated his preference for a strong Secretar y .l5 This 
further distresse d the three Senators mentioned above, and 
more r estrictions were suggested to control the Secretary of' 
Defense. These i :1cluded limiting the activities of the 
Secretary to general supervision of the Department, reserv-
ing all powers no t specifically given h im to the individual 
13. Hearings befor e the Committee on Ar med Services, United 
St ates Senate, 80th Congress, 1st Session on S ?58, 3 
Parts, USGPO, 194?, hereafter cited a s l94? Senate 
Unification Hear ings, pps 44-46, 29- 31, 89ff', 153ff, 
599ff', etc. 
14. Ibid., p 120. 
15. Ibid., pps 347-3?5. 
services, and speeif'ying the f'unetions of' the services in 
the bill.16 
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The second o stacle to the Committee's effort was the 
group's distrust of the Ex:ecutive witnesses. It did not 
seem possible, to some of' the Senators, that Secretary of' 
the Navy Forresta. and other Navy witnesses could really 
favor this bill w1en they had opposed the unification bill 
the previous year ~ Did the witnesses really believe in 
this bill or were they simply carrying out the orders of' 
the President? T .. is point brought on some very heated 
t . . 17 ques ~on~ng. 
In contrast o this distrust of' administration wit-
nesses was the good will with which certain non-adminis-
t t . . t . d 18 Of ti l ra ~on w~ nesses were rece~ve • par cu ar 
16. The primary concern of' the Senators was to protect the 
Naval Aviatio. and the Marines. General Vandergrift, 
the Cormnandan·t of the Marine Corps, met in executive 
session with ·t he Comm.i ttee to work this out and the 
question of h.i s approval was important in securing 
passage of the bill when it went to the Senate floor. 
See Forrestal , £E• £!!., pps 269 and 274. Also N.Y. 
Times, May 28 , 1947. 
17. This is apparJnt in a number of cases but in particular 
see the quest i oning of' Admiral Sherman by Senator 
Bridges. l947. Senate Unification Hearings, ~· cit., p 
l53ff. and as reported in the N.Y. Times, April 2,1947. 
18. See testimony of Admirals Hart and King and General 
Edson in l947 _Senate Unification Hearings, On p 377 
Senator Bridg s said to Admiral Hart, "It also gives 
you, Admiral, the right to speak out without being 
throttled and browbeaten, as some of the people who 
have testified before us have been; does it not?" 
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importance in this group was Mr. Eberstadt, the original 
author of the Navy plan and an advocate of the coordination 
approach. Many o the changes finally adopted used wordings 
suggested by Mr. :l'oerstadt •1 g 
By the time t :1e Committee was ready for executive 
sessions several t :n.ings were apparent. The Marines would 
be protected. The powers of the Secretary of Defense would 
be limited. On t h ese points all the Senators except Sena-
tor Robertson were satisfied. The latter saw the bill as a 
long range plot by the Army General Staff to seize control 
of tl1e Armed Forc e s and indoctrinate the country with 
militarism. His a ttitude is of interest as an example of 
the distrust that :military matters can inspire. 20 
The bill fina lly passed reflected most of the decisions 
made by the Senate Cormnittee. The House insisted on further 
protection for the Marines and Navy. The activities of the 
National Security Council were restricted. In general, 
however, the Senate Committeemen were backed by the re-
mainder of Congress. 
19. - Ibid., pps 670-696. 
20. Senator Robertson was largely responsible ror General 
Edson being ca lled to testify, he attempted to in-
troduce a substitute bill, and he fought the bill on 
the floor. For statements of attitude see 1947 
Senate Unifica tion Hearings and N. Y. Times for period. 
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The first two years of the new Defense Department were 
not peaceful. The new Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, 
found his concept~~ of limited central authority, no single 
Chief of Staff, aic coordination between autonomous depart-
ments, left much t o be desired in practice. In a period of 
economy, Secretar~, Forrestal had difficulty in achieving 
coordination end agreement on budgetary matters. The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff w:l1ihout the impetus of a war had difficulty 
in reaching agreemonts.21 
Secretary For ::-estal concluded that some changes were 
necessary.22 Coneurrently, the Hoover Commission, investi-
gating the entire :s:z:ecuti ve Branch of the Government, reach-
ed similar conclus ions. The Commission's task force which 
investigated the : ~~tense Department was headed by Mr. Eber-
stadt. It found t hat civilian control of the military 
largely failed, e: t}ept for the control of appropriations by 
Congress. This f a ilure was due to lack of authority for the 
----------------- -·--------------------------------.----------
21. See Forrestal, op. cit., for a description of the diffi-
cult~es of thia period. Secretary Forrestal was unable 
to get agreeme:1t from the JCS on the budget. When he 
did, the agre~Jnent did not survive once hearings before 
the Appropriat ions Committees commenced. He experienced 
insubordinatio:1 from the Secretary of the Air Force. A 
:partial commentary on the situation is that immediately 
after testifyi:1g before the Senate Committee on recom-
mended changes to the organizational structure, Mr. 
Forrestal resi sned and shortly thereafter committed 
suicide. 
22. For a stateme2t of Forrestal's views see Forrestal, 
~- ill·' p 5:39. 
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Secretary of DefenE>El. Further, the wealmess of the JCS, in 
which each member ~~t s largely an advocate of his own service, 
was criticized. Th E: Commission· sunnned up its comments and 
recommendations by E;tating that all authority in the Depart-
ment of Defense should be centered in the Secretary of De-
fense, subject onl~ to the authority of the President and 
Congress. 23 The v:i. mr..rs of Secretary Forrestal and the Com-
mission formed the hasis for legislation recommended to 
Congress by the PrE::~Bident on March 5, 1949. 
Three items were of central interest in the 1949 Sen-
ate hearings. Two of these, more power for the Secretary 
of Defense and a Chairman for the JCS, were recom...mended to 
Congress by the adm:Lnistration. The third, a performance 
budget, was inserted by the Senators.24 
The administration's cas e for increased powers for the 
Secretary of Defen se was presented by Secretary Forrestal. ~Ar. 
Forrestal, appearing on the first day of the hearings, stated: 
"I would like to address myself briefly to what I 
believe may be the chief objection to the proposed 
amendments; namely, that these amendments •Nould vest in 
the Secretary of Defense too great a concentration of 
power. I have given long and serious thought to this 
23. Hoover Commission Reuort, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc, 
l949, Sec. VIII. 
24. Briefly a performance type budget a ttempts to group all 
costs of a single project under one budget item. For-
merly, identical items were grouped together regardless 
of where the item was to be used. For a discussion of 
this type budget, its development, and use, see Mosher, 
££· cit. 
objection beoause it is similar to an objection to 
which I lent my support two years ago. 
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"After having viewed the problem at close range 
for the past 18 months, I must admit to you quite 
frankly that my position on the question has changed. 
I am now conYinced that a failure to endow this offi-
cial with su:ff icient authority to control effectively 
the conduct of our military affairs will force upon us 
far greater ;·Jecuri ty risks than will be the case if 25 singleness o:f control and responsibility are achieved. '" 
In similar manner Secretary Forrestal outlined the need 
for a chairman fo:r the JCS. All of the administration wit-
nesses supported .Secretary Forrestal except General Cates 
of the 1\furine Cor:~ s , who saw in increa sed powers for the 
Secretary and a J CS chairman a danger to his service. 26 
The administr ation's views did not meet with unquali-
fied approval. As in 1947, the Senators continued to object 
to gi ving l arge powers to the Secretary of Defense. Further, 
t hey were concerned about the proposed Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. In both of these attitudes the Senators 
were supported by two key witnesses, former President Hoover 
and Mr . Eberstadt. 27 
On t he question of powers for the Secretary, former 
President Hoover and Mr. Eberstadt were in general agreement 
with the administration except that they desired to 1odge 
25. As quo.ted in Mosher, .Q!!•. cit., p 35. 
26. Hearings before the Comm2ttee on Armed Services, U.S.Sen-
ate, 8lst Cong , on S 1269 and S 1843, USGPO,l949, here-
after cited as 1949 Senate Unification Hearings. General 
Cates was opposed to both increased powers for the Secre-
tary of Defense and any authority for the Chairman of the 
JCS. In both a ses he was worried over the possibilities 
of the Marines being transferred to the Army or in some 
other manner r estricted. 
27. Ibid., pps 48-70 and 127-145. 
31. 
certain statutory powers in the hands of subordinate 
officials, rather than group all such power in the Secre-
tary's hands. Se:nators Bridges, Saltonstall, and Baldwin 
were not willing ·· o go that far, but insisted on restrict-
ing the Secretary from ~king any changes that would in-
fringe the functi on of any of the services. 28 The com-
bined testimony of ex-President Hoover and Mr. Eberstadt 
and the administra tion witnesses did convince the Senators 
that the right of the Secretaries of theArmy, Navy and 
Air Force to go over the head of the Secretary of Defense 
must be restricted. 29 
Two Senators were opposed to the weakening of adminis-
trative authority. Senator Morse fought the matter out on 
the floor of the Senate and was defeated. 30 Senator Lyndon 
Johnson argued within the Committee for increased powers on 
the basis that only in this way could you expect the Secre-
tary to obtain economy. His effort came to nought as 
Chairman Tydings pointed out; 
28. See for example statements of those Senators during 
testimony of Forrestal, ibid., p 6ff, and testimony of 
Eberstadt, ibid., p 48ft:---
29 • .Mr. Hoover told s 'enator Bridges that organization was 
impossible without subordination, ibid., p 127. See 
also testimony of I~. Patterson, ibid., p 145ff. 
30. Congressional Q.uarterly Almanac, Vol. V, 1949, p 479, 
N. Y. Times, May 26, 1949. 
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'~et's : ay aside for a minute the robes of states-
manship and :P.ut on the robes of politics long enough 
to answer th:i s question. I like your thoughts very 
much persona: ly. If we safeguard the Army, the Navy, 
the Air Forc e , the combatant functions which are 
assigned by l aw to these military departments and per-
mit transfers in so far as they do not transgress 
missions and rules, do you think we can get it through 
the Congress?"31 
Senator Tydings t hen indicated he didn't wish to have the 
entire bill rejected over this one point. 
According to the bill, the proposed Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Sta ff would be the head of that body and the 
principal military advisor to the President. To the Senators 
this approach smacked of adopting a single Armed Forces 
Chief of Staff and raising one military man to control of 
all the Armed Forces. They saw in such a policy danger that 
~he proposed Chairman would make decisions properly the 
prerogative of the President. To prevent this the Senators 
insisted that the J"CS Chairman have no vote in JCS deliber-
ations, that he be required to report any disagreements 
within the JCS in addition to his own views, and that his 
term of service be limited. 32 In summary, the new Chairman 
----------------------------------------------------------31. 1949 Senate Unification Hearings, testimony of }Ar. 
W. J. McNeil of Defense Department, p 238 ff. 
~2. Ibid. These ·points came up throughout the hearings as 
the various witnesses were questioned. Probably the 
strongest statement of intent was Senator Byrd's. He 
said he could not vote for the bill unless the Chair-
man was required to report all views, not just his 
own. Testimony of JCS p 108 ff. 
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would be merely a. presiding officer. 
The third inportant item was the budgetary provision. 
Mr. Eberstadt and. ex-President Hoover stated tha t economy 
could be achieved only if the budget process was improved. 
The Senators sei2;ed the point unanimously and asked Mr. 
Eberstadt to dra~r up recommendations. 33 In conjunction 
with representati.ves of the Defense Department this was 
done. The budgetary proposals became Title 4 of the bill. 
The consideration of the bill in the House Armed 
Services CommitteJe centered around the same three points. 
Although Chairmar Vinson and his committee strongly opposed 
either strengthering the hands of t he Secretary of Defense 
or providing a Chairman of the JCS with any power, they 
favored the budgetary provisions. 34 Among the alternate 
solutions conside~red in attempting to solve the disagree-
ment, were the ne~ing of a civilian chairman for the JCS, 
provisions that neither the Secretary of Defense nor the 
Chairman of the J~·cs should be "sole" spokesman, and the 
appointment of a JCS Chairman without vote or precedence. 
Finally, on July 12, the entire mat ter was thrown out by a 
33. Ibid., Initia l testimony of' :Mr. Eberstadt. 
34. See t heN. Y. Times for the period June to August 1949; 
Full Commi tte~e Hearing on ER 5632 to Reorganize Fiscal 
Management i n the National Military Establishment, To 
Promote Econe>my, and Efficiency, and for other Purposes, 
USGPO, 1949; and, Congressional ~uarterly, 1949, ~.cit. 
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vote of 13-12 in reaction to certain of Secretary of Defense 
Johnson's actions on the B-36 matter. The Committee report-
ed a modified bill which included only the budgetary pro-
visions and even changed these to further restrict the 
Secretary of Defen se.35 
At this point the President took a hand to force the 
reorganization. l l series of political moves brought the 
House into line and the Congressional Conference Committee 
adopted a bill generally follovdng the lines of the Senate 
measure. The bil1 passed in the House although a number of 
Congressmen from t;he Armed Services Committee still objected 
to powers granted the Secretary of Defense.36 
35. The Senate fo :-::-ced the hand of the House Committee by 
sending a reo· ganization plan to Congress that did 
everything exeept change the fiscal policies, the one 
point that the Committee was agreeable to doing. Thus, 
the House Cornni ttee would either have the President 
doing solilething that was regarded as a Congressional 
prerogative o:_ be forced to gi:ve in. The House gave in 
by adopting the Senate version of the bill in the Con-
ference Commi-ttee. Since Chairman Vinson had only 
shortly befor~ agreed to give the President such powers 
over the Defense Department, it is possible tha t this 
was by arrangement between the two. It is not to be 
thought that t he Congressmen had changed their minds 
just because t heir hands were f orced. During other 
hearings that f ollowed the event, comments were made 
t hat the coun· r y had embarked on the discredited "gen-
eral staff co ~'J.Cept." Several of the members of the 
Cerami ttee also opp osed the bill on the floor. 
36. By this time i3ecretary Johnson had replaced Secretary 
] 'orrestal in he Defense Department. The new Secretary 
was a t odds viT:l t;h a number of Congressmen over his 
cancellation ~f a new carrier for the Navy. This had 
an unfortunat e effect on the attempts to secure more 
power for t h e Secretary of Defense. 
35 
There is a postscript to the Congressional attempts to 
achieve unification. By 1953 it was apparent that the de-
fense organization was ·still deficient. The Secreta ry of 
Defense, Robert L)vett, said so. 37 The Chairman of the JCS, 
General Bradley, agreed. 38 An independent committee, headed 
by Mr. Nelson Roc kefeller, considered the matter, and con-
39 curred. To correct the deficiencies noted by these three 
sources, President Eisenhower reorganized the Defense De-
partment. He strengthened the Secretary of Defense by 
concentrating all authority in that official's hands and 
abolishing the par tially independent boards, such as the 
Munitions Board. The Secretary was provided with a staff 
in the form of six additional Assistant Secretaries of 
Defense. Finally, President Eisenhower strengthened the 
Chairman of the J 'CS by making him responsible for the JCS 
staff. All this the President accomplished through an 
Executive Reorganization Order, bypassing the difficulties 
encountered by the preceding legislative at~empts at 
. f" t. 40 un~ ~ca ~on. 
-----------------------------------------------------------37. Ltr. Sec. Lovett to President Truman Nov 18, 52, . a s re-
ported in A- N·- AF Journal, Jan 10, 53. 
38. C~neral Bradley set forth his views in the Saturday 
Evening Post, August 22 and 29, 1953. 
39. The Rockefeller Committee was appointed on Feb 18, 1953 
to consider t he matter of Defense Department organization. 
The Committee 's report was publ ished in the A-N-AF 
Journal on Me.y 2, 1953 at the same time as the text of 
the reorganization plan the President sent to Congress. 
40. Ibid. 
ARMY ORG.A .. NIZATION 
The Army Org~mization Act of 1950 is less important 
than the legislation just discussed. It serves to illus-
36 
trate again the concern over delegation of large powers to 
a single administJ.ator. More important, it shows the dis-
trust of a genera staff and the background of that distrust. 
In 1949 the Army was still operating under legislation 
passed as early a s 1920. Huch of this legislation was 
highly restrictive and out of date. The purpose of the 
proposed bill was to modernize the Army's legal basis. 41 
This included givi ng the Secretary of the Army sufficient 
authority to opernte the military establishment. When the 
bill came before "the House Committeemen, they felt it 
granted too much authority to the Sec r etary of the Army. 
Although the Con~ittee subscribed to giving the Secretary 
complete control over the Army, they did not subscribe to 
his exercising tha t power vdthout reference to Congress. 
· The Con~i ttee, therefore, restricted t he Secretary's au-
thori ty in peace ·time but granted him larger powers in time 
of war . 42 
· The discussions on the general s t arr covered a number 
of subjects inclu ing the responsibili ties of the Chief of 
41. 1950 Army Hear ings, .2.:£· cit., p 6023. 
42. Ibid, pps 6013, 6036, 6125, 6128, and 6235. 
Sta~~, the number o ~ Assistant or Deputy Chie~s o~ Sta~~, 
and the total num· er o~ o~~icers on t he sta~~. These 
37 
discussions indicated clearly that the Congressmen were not 
advocates o~ the general sta~~. Rather, they regarded it 
as a Prussian inn va tion, unsuited ~or a democracy. 43 
General Collins , realizing this ~eeling, undertook to 
explain the general sta~~ concept as sed in the American 
Army. He pointed out that the genera . sta~~ in the American 
Army is not a sepa rate branch with spElcial privileges as in 
the German Army, but rather a temporar y assignment, open to 
all o~~icers, to certain sta~~ duties o~ a general nature. 
Later in the hearings General Collins was called on again 
to explain that t h e general sta~~ was not a policy making 
body but existed to carry out policieEJ made by the Secre-
tary o~ the Ar.my. General Collins concluded by saying, 
~'lliat you: are talking about is, and your ~ears 
have in my judgement been involved with, not the Ger-
man general sta~~ system within the Ar.my, but with 
the application o~ that system s omewhere else. Now 
that is a separate matter, in my opinion, completely 
distinct and separate from the proposition of whether 
a general sta~~ conc~it is a good one, or a bad one, 
or a dangerous one." 
General Collins' remarks removed some o~ the mis-
apprehensions about a general staf~. Nevertheless, dis-
trust o~ a general staff does not die with one explanation. 
Limits were placed on the number on t he staf~, the number 
.. 
43. Ibid., p 6046 ff. 
44. Ibid., p 6208. See also pps 6063 and 6202. 
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of Assistant and Deputy Secretaries, nd the number of 
military personnel on duty in Vvashing"'"on and the length of 
their tours of d .ty there. 45 
On this bas:i.s the bill went to t he Senate. No new 
matters were brought up in these hear:i ngs and the bill was 
passed with the same basic provisions as in the House. 46 
RESERVE FORCES 
The final example concerns the Committeemen's feelings 
with regard to t he reserve f'orces. Although there is little 
concrete organizational- legislation to observe, suf'ficient 
statements have been made by the legislators to indicate 
their attitudes. 
The Def'ense Deparuuent presents the concept of' a small 
regular force backed by a mass of tra ined reserves to the 
legislators as t he democratic answer to the sustained threat 
of' international tensions. 47 The Committeemen are in 
45. See Public Law 581, Short Title, Organization of' the Army. 
46. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, u.s. Sen-
ate, 8lst Congress, 2d Session on S 2334 and HR 8198, 
Army Organiza tion Act of 1950. General Collins, Fore-
warned by the quest1ons in the House, explained the gen-
eral staf'f' concept to the Senators early in the hear-
ings. There was comparatively little discussion or dis-
agreement witih the bill as presented. 
47. Hearings bef'ore the Committee on Armed Services, 
House of' Repr esentatives, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 
on HR 4866, USGPO, 1951, hereafter cited as House 
Reserve Hear:lngs. Statement of 1::rs. Rosenberg on 
p 185. 
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complete agreement with this concept. Congressmen Vinson, 
Brooks, and others have fought steadil y to secure a sound 
reserve program. To them it represent s the only chance to 
reduce the size of t he standing army and thereby reduce ex-
penditures and the t hreat of mili tari ::~m. 48 The Comm.i ttee' s 
support of U.MT is a concrete example of the efforts to 
vitalize the reser ve forces. 
There is, unfortunately, an area where the agreement 
between the Executive and Legislative Branches breaks do\vn. 
The administration of the reserves by the services, par-
ticularly the recal l of men to active duty during the Korean 
conflict, has displ eased the legislators. 49 This distrust 
of the Executive agents came to a head in 1951 during the 
hearings on the ADne d Forces Reserve ct. A determined 
effort wa s made by pressure groups to lodge the authority 
to recall reservists in civilian hands rather than those of 
th . 50 e servJ.ces. 1res timony of the service witnesses showed 
the complete fall acy of such proposal 3. The legislators 
then determined t o l imit executive au·l~hori ty over this 
48. Hearin gs before the Comndttee on · rmed Services, House 
of Representatives, 82nd Congress 9 1st Session on HR 
1752, UMT, USGP O, 1951, hereafter cited as House ill~T 
Hearings 1951,, p 776 for statement by Vinson. Also 
Senate Reserve Hearings, ££• cit. ~ p 164 ff for state-
ment by Rep. Brooks. 
49. See particularly the House Reserv . Hearings, ££• cit., 
for the sentiments of the Congres~:~men. 
50. For example s ee Senate Reserve He~rings, ££• cit., 
p 69 ff for t e s t imony Mr. Lavelle of CIO. 
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manpower pool in another way. The number of reservists the 
President could recall to active duty without a resolution 
by Congress was limited to 1,500,000. ~51 The reserve pro-
gram, in short, is subject to the same desires for effieien-
cy, economy, ru1d restrictions as other military legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
The roots of' the emotions that have been discussed are 
not al"livays easy to find. Undoubtedly , some of the basis is 
historical. Methods of providing for the common defense 
have received attemtion since the earl iest colonial days. 
At the same time, this country has be(:Jn wary of military 
might on the domestic scene from its ·very inception. The 
rivalry between the Legislative and Ex:ecuti ve Branches has 
existed since the.:y were both first prescribed in the Con-
stitution. Such historical background is unchangeable. 
Certain other factors are susceptible to positive ac-
tion. Secretary Forrestal demonstrat ed how far an adminis-
trator can go in removing distrust of himself, while Secre-
~~!-~~~E-~~E--~~~-. ~~~~-~~~~~~~~~.::: __ :~ ~~~~E~~~-P~~¥-~~-----
51. PL 476, 82nd Congress, Armed Forc l~S Reserve Act of 1952. 
52. See Forrestal:. , .2.J2.. cit. , for examples of effort Sec. 
Forrest8.l put; into Congressional :relations. The Secre-
tary made sure that each Congressman who was important 
to legislation affecting the servi ces was on friendly 
terms. He di:::cussed legislative p:roblems in advance with 
them. He was sure to thank them w. en legislative obsta-
cles were overcame. Above all, he made sure that 
Congress was informed about event1s before they got into 
the newspaper. Sec. Johnson failed to take these precau-
tions on a number of occasions and the Congressmen 
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important part when the question of a general staff arises, 
and the services might do well to foll ow the advice of 
Congressman Cole, who said, " ••• If yo 1 folks dovm there 
would just forget the word 'staff' and 'general' and call it 
something else you wouldn't have anyWhere near the trouble 
53 you are getting about staffing your p ~3ople." He pointed 
out that the Navy does not use the term generalstaff and 
does not have ·as much difficulty. 
In conclusi on, those attempting · o secure defense 
legislation must recognize the pitfall s created by anti-mil-
itarism and distaste for the Executive , and attempt to 
utilize the more constructive sentiments. That the Commit-
teemen themselves recognize this need is shown by the words 
of Senator Lyndon Johnson, 
"Our government has taken el aborate precautions to 
avoid .cormnitting this nation to any permanency in the 
mobilization policies. We in Congress have been told 
and we have apparently accepted it as wise--that we 
must be more afraid of doing too much than of doing too 
little. ·what is the result? For the common defense we 
have thrown up a chicken-wire fe· ce, not a wall of 
.Armed might .. 
"Those of us in Congress know these things. We 
know that we have been underwriting makeshift mobiliza-
tion with only a vague hope that the real thing may 
come along, sooner or later. Is there now a man among 
us who can look the people in the eye and conscien-
tiously say, 'Your Government has done a~t that it 
should have done to make freedom safe'," 
---------------- ~-----------------------------------------resented it. See N.Y. Times, July ?, 1949. 
53. 1950 Army Hearings, .2.£• cit., p 60 53. 
54. Senate addre s s as reported in Congressional Digest, 
Jan. 1951, p ?. 
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CHAPTER III 
SPECIFIC ATriTUDES TOWARDS THE "'OUR SERVICES 
An illustrator , asked to portray the American soldier, 
might well turn back through the pages of history to the 
year 1??5. Here he would find citizens leaving their homes 
with muskets in hand to defend their r ights. These Minute-
men were all volunteers. 
The tradition of the volunteer ar my was strong through-
out the first ?5 years of the Republic . The Revolution, the 
War of 1812, the ear ly Indian Wars, t e Mexican War and the 
first battles of the Civil War were f ught by volunteers. 
As each war prior to the Civil War wa :3 concluded success-
fully, the system generally was deemed satisfactory.1 
1. The M~litary Policy of the United States by Bvt. Maj. 
Gen. :Emory U:pton, United States Army, USGPO, 191?, Up-
ton's study covers the period up t o 1862. He concludes 
that the nation was successful in spite of its manpower 
policies, not because of them. One aspect of those pol-
icies that UJ;lton particularly condemned still exists 
today to a considerable extent, t he intrusion of the 
state governments in national mil i tary policy in the 
shape of the National Guard. Since the matter did not 
receive part:i.cular attention by t e Colll11li ttees during 
the period i n question, it is not touched on in this 
study. The :political power of the militia representa-
tives was apparent, however, in t h e solicitude with 
which the lee:;islators and Defense Department treated 
these gentlemen. The position of militia in modern 
defense should be an object of an independent study. 
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By the middle of the Civil War t he volunteer renks were 
thinning out a nd the government was f o rced to resort to 
forced service, t he draft. Two systems of manpower procure-
ment for the armed f orces have existec.L since that time. 
When small numbers are required, the nation relies on vol-
unteers. When enough volunteers are not forthcoming, as 
during the Civil Wa r , World Wars I and II, the Cold War and 
Korea, the volunteer system has been ·upplemented by the 
draft. Never, however, has the draft entirely replaced 
volunteers. 
The coexistence of these two diverse systems of man-
power procurement ha s certain unfortw1ate results. Major 
General Otto Nelson described the situation existing during 
World War II as follows, 
"In general, the Air Forces and the Navy vied with 
each other for the cream of the ation's manhood. Men 
with technical skills were assigned to the Army Service 
Forces. What was left was assigned to the Army Ground 
Forces. The Navy did not wish t o use Selective Service, 
insist ing that the Navy's personnel needs could be fill-
ed through voluntary enlistments .. But 'voluntary en-
listment' was hardly the right t erm for what was actu-
ally done. As additional groups or classes were about 
to be inducted by Selective Servi ce, the Navy would 
secure the voluntary enlistment of what they considered 
to be the cream of the crop by s ~lling them on the idea 
that in the Navy they would get better pay, more rapid 
advancement, better living accommodations, and more 
enjoyable servi ce. The Air Forc e then attempted to 
out-bid the Navy to obtain personnel for their pilot 
combat crew program. Superficial ly, this might have 
appeared to be healthy competition but in the absence 
of over-all standards and contro there was no intelli-
gent competit ion. Men with lead ~rship ability and men 
with high mental and superb phys .ca.l qualifications 
were assigned t o naval shore establishments and air 
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~orce ground crew and air base j obs that did not re-
quire such talents while the need ~or combat i~~antry­
men with these quali~ications wa::~ very great." 
As a result o~ this competition, certain o~ the ser-
vices -became largely volunteer organizations, while others 
were forced to rely on the draft to s E:~cure personnel. In 
general the Army has been the service forced to resort to 
the draft. 
This competition for manpower ha '3 been carried forward 
to the political arena. In the compe ition for funds and 
favorable legislation the Congressmen are not immune to a 
bias for a particular service. Further, these biases re-
:fleet the attitude of the country as a whole. The Congress-
men, too, prefer the"volunteet"services. This chapter will 
be devoted to showing this preference and analysing its 
basis and importance. 
THE MA.RINE CORPS 
No one who v-olunteers for the Un "ted States Marine 
Corps expects sof't living. Yet, as w." th all elite troops, 
the Marines have con stantly been a popular service. Nei-
ther the Corps' enviable combat record on land, sea, and 
air from the shores of Tripoli to Kor~a or the ability to 
attract volunteers has been lost on t .. 1e legislators. No 
------------------------------------- --------------------2. Nelson, ~· _2it., p 595. 
component of the ser vices has received such f avorable 
treatment from Congr ess. 
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Unification brought the question of the status of the 
~mrines into prominence. The representatives of the Navy 
Departmerrt were dist urbed by reports iihat the Army desired 
to do away with t h e Marines, or restri ct them to a minor 
role in future co.mbat. 3 They secured the backing of certain 
key Congressmen i n opposing unification until they received 
assurances that t he status of the Mar ·nes and Naval Air 
Service would be protected. This prot ection was to be ac-
complished by an Executive Order spec i fying the missions 
and status of the services. This order would be issued con-
currently with the implementation of t he proposed law. 4 
The anticipated Executive Order did not satisfy the 
Congressional suppor ters of the Marin~s. When General 
Vandergrift appeared before the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee, he expressed dissatisfaction dth certain sections 
of the proposed bill and presented draft amendments designed 
to make the Marine functions and status a matter of law. 5 
The members of the Senate Committee gave strong support to 
the General. 'IJl hen t he bill appeared on the floor, Chairman 
Gurney announced that the sections dealing with the Marines 
3. Forrestal, .2.:E.• cit., p 224-5. 
4. See Chapter II. 
5. 1947 Senate Un i f ication Hearings,~· cit., pps 411-447. 
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had the approval of General Vandergrift. 6 Indeed, this 
section was considered so important that Mr. Eberstadt and 
several Senators told Secretary Forrestal that unless the 
Marines were protect ed by law, the bill would not pass. 7 
At the 1949 unification hearings in the Senate the ~Aa-
rines again expressed dissatisfaction~ The Commandant of 
the Corps, General Cates, opposed strengthening the powers 
of the Secretary of Defense or giving any authority to the 
Chairman of the JCS. All Senators, except Senators :Morse 
and Lyndon Johnson, came to the General's support and the 
Secretary of Defense's powers to transfer military per-
sonnel were restricted.8 
The matter did not rest there. During the 1949 B-36 
hearings, the Marines again were compl imented on every side 
by the legislators. A number of these statements are in-
dications of the basis for the Committee members' attitude 
toward the Marines. Representative Ri vers called them the 
greatest fighting force in history. 9 Representative Cole 
stated that the American people are sentimentally attached 
to the Marines since they get more fighting done for less 
money. 10 Representative Van Zandt sai d the service should 
-----------------------------------------------------------6. N. Y. Times, May 28, 194?. 
?. Forrestal, ££• cit., pps 269, 2?4. 
8. See Chapter II. 
9. B-36 Hearings,, .2.£• cit., p 385. 
10. Ibid., p 383. 
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be represented before the Joint Chiefs of Staff as our 
amphibious experts.11 Representatives Brooks, Short, 
Sasseeer, and Vinson all spoke favorably concerning the 
Corps.12 Not one to pass up an enthusiastic audience, Gen-
eral Cates testified strongly against the reductions in the 
Marine Corps and protested the lack of representation on 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.13 The report of the hearings 
reflected his desire for a place on the Joint Chiefs of 
Staft.14 On this point more was to be heard. 
The unification and B-36 hearings were merely prelim-
inaries to the main effort of the Marine supporters. In 
1951 bills were introduced in both the Senate and the House 
to fix the minimum size of the Marine Corps and to make the 
Commandant a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This bill 
deserves particular attention as it sets a minimum strength 
for a component of the armed forces, something that has 
been done for no other component. Also, it was passed in 
spite of the united opposition of the Army, Navy, Air Force, 
11. Ibid., p 393. 
12. Ibid., pps 377 ff. 
13. Ibid., pps 379 ff. 
14. Report of Investigation by the Committee on Armed Ser-
vices of the House of Representatives, 8lst Congress, 
1st Session, on Unification and Strategy, USGPO, 1950, 
hereafter cited as Unification Report, p 46. 
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and Department of Defense. 
The discussions of the Marine Corps bill have three 
central themes: the rela tionship of the Marine Conn:nandant 
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the size of the Corps, and 
the relat ionship of the Corps to the Navy. Actually, the 
problem was l arger and involved the entire concept of na-
tional defense. Representative Sassecer commented that 
the Department of Defense wanted a narrow interpretation of 
the use of Marines, while Congress want ed a. broad inter-
pretation.15 These interpretations involve differences 
of approach to the subject. 
The Defense Department contends that the Marine Corps 
is a part of the Navy and subject to the authority of the 
Chief of Naval Opera tions., The primary use of the Corps 
under this interpretation would be i n connection with Naval 
campaigns. As part of the Navy, their size should logically 
depend on the size of the naval forces and they would be 
represented adequately on the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the 
Chief of Naval Operations. In JCS discussion of matters 
directly affecting the Marine Corps, the Chief of Naval 
Operations may take the Marine Commandant to the meeting 
15. Full Committee Hearings on S 6?? to Fix the Personnel 
Strength of the United States Marine Corps, and to 
Establish the Relationship of the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, House of 
Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, USGPO, 
1951, hereafter cited as House Marine Hearings, p 86?. 
as an advisor as any other member might bring a technical 
expert.16 
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The Congressional approach sees t he Marines as a force 
designed to accept the first shock of combat while the other 
services prepare. Therefore the Committees refused to accept 
the size of the Navy as a factor in determining the size of 
the Marine Corps, or to accept the idea that the Chief of 
Naval Operations can represent the Mar ines before the Joint 
Chiefs. Further, certain Congressmen contended that the 
Marine Corps is an entirely separate service, subject to the 
authority of the Secretary of the Navy. They said it is not 
under the Chief of Naval Operations except when placed there 
for particular tasks such as the operation of the Fleet 
Marine Force.17 
The Marine supporters in Congress were legion, and 43 
Senators and 63 Representatives sponsor ed the bill.18 Led 
by Senator Douglas and Representative Mansfield, they 
advanced every argument that could be found.l9 Marine 
16. Hearings before a Subcommittee of t he Committee on Armed 
Services United States Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session 
on S 577, USGPO, 1951, hereafter cited as Senate !viarine 
Hearings. Testimony of Admiral Sherman, p 72 ff. 
1?. See House Marine Hearinf$s, .££• cit .. , and Senate Marine 
Hearings, op. cit., var~ous pagings. 
18. A-N-AF Journal, Vol. LXXXVIII, p 803. 
19. Senate Marine Hearings,££~ cit., Senator.Douglas actu-
ally sat with the Committee much of the t~me. The Chair-
man of the group was Senator Douglas' good friend Sena-
tor Kefauver who Douglas backed actively for the Presi-
dential nomination in 1952. He was so active that the 
hearings in many ways were his private show. 
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preparedness for i ns t ant combat was cited. Greater fire 
power per man and more fighting men per unit were claimed 
for the Marine Division as compared to the Army division. 
The Marine Corps wa s credited with the development of both 
close air support and amphibious methods. Better training 
methods were claimed for the Marines and the ability to 
attract volunteers was cited. Both l egal precedents and 
recruiting posters were quoted to prove the Marines are a 
separate service, and their greater economy of operation 
was noted. The lack of background in land warfare of the 
Chief of Naval Operations was mentioned to show his inabil-
ity to represent t he Marine Corps before the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. The Army was accused of trying to destroy the 
Marines. Many of t he arguments were either entirely spur-
ious or had limited validity. 20 Nevertheless, a hard core 
of opinion favorable to the Marines remains. It is best 
expressed by Chairman Vinson , who, in reporting the bill to 
the House, said, 
"A student of history of the Marine Corps can 
only conclude t ha t America has a vital and continuing 
need for the maintenance of a finely coordinated 
powerful ground-air fighting team in constant readiness. 
There is no doubt that such a for ce, highLy versatile, 
fast moving, and hard hitting, i n which attributes the 
Marine Corps has always excelled, will have a powerful 
and continuing impact in relation to lesser inter-
national disturbances •••• Such a ready combat force, 
20. Senate Marine Hearings, .£l2.· cit., and House Marine 
Hearings, ££• cit., various pagings. 
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with its highly integrated air arm trained to work in 
the most painst aking coordina tion, with the ground 
forces with a proud tradition of being immediately 
ready in time of crisis, may well be in a position 
to stay the progress of a full scale aggression long 
enough for our country to mobilize its vast defense 
machinery.n21 
The efforts of the Department of Defense representa-
tives to refute the arguments of the Marine Corps advocates 
met with little success. Afuniral Sherman, and Generals 
Collins and Vandenberg all attempted t o explain the basic 
considerations involved. They pointed out that part of the 
Marine efficiency comes from combat and logistical support 
provided by the Army, Navy and Air Force. Without this aid 
the Marines are not capable of taking the first blow by 
themselves while t he other services mobilize. General 
Collins explained t hat the Army was abl e to atta in as many 
top men and high esprit as the Marine Corps in its volun-
teer units such as the paratroops. 22 These facts convinced 
a f ew Congressmen but most retained their enthusiasm for the 
21. A-N-AF Journal, May 24, 1952, p 1192. 
22. Senate Marine Hearings, .QE.. cit., 'Testimony of Admiral 
Sherman, p 72 ff. Also testimony of Under Sec. of Def. 
Lovett, p 149 ff, ~AX. Lovett also informed the Committee 
that Mr. Eberstadt was opposed to the bill but this time 
the Committee i gnored 1~. Eberstadt's recommendations. 
House Marine Hearings, ££• cit., pps ?62 ff, 858 ff, 
885 ff, General Vandenberg, under questioning, frankly 
said the N~rine s were a luxury. 
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Marines. 23 A minimum strength was set for the Marines and 
the Commandant. was to be a member of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff whenever items affecting his troops were under 
discussion. 24 
Clearly, the Marines have captured a secure legisla-
tive position as an elite force. This position has been 
secured over the ob j ection of the top military and civilian 
advisors, who are responsible for organizing and adminis-
tering the Ar.med Forces. 
23. A-N-AF Journal, May 24, 1952, p 1192, Rep. Clemente 
opposed the bill on the floor and quoted statistics to 
prove that the Marines were not always more ready to 
go into action than the Army. However, Vinson, Short, 
Arends, and Van Zandt were all fi ghting for the Marines. 
The last even looked forward to the day when we would 
be able to skeletonize the other services and use the 
Marines for our first shield. 
24. Considering the distaste of the Congressmen for any-
thing that paralle~s German military structure in the 
shape of a general staff, it is interesting to note 
the similarity of the position between the Marines as 
a separate elite army, and the Waffen SS of World War 
II. This organization, which was a military organiza-
tion separate from the Secret Police, had a number of 
divisions which fought along side the regular 
vVhermacht divisions. 
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AIR FORCE 
Close to the Marines in Congress i onal esteem is the 
Air Force. Since this service is acknowledged universally 
to be of critical i mportance in modern defense, it is 
difficult to pinpoi nt specific events that show Congres-
sional favoritism. Nevertheless, on two occasions, this 
preference ha s come into sharp focus, the struggle for the 
70 group Air Force and the Air Force Organization Act of 
1951. 
The 70 group program had its genesis at the end of 
World War II as the Air Force post war plan. It was 
presented during t he period when the Army was campaigning 
for Universal Military Training and t he Navy was calling 
for a new large carrier. 25 
In 1947 the President and Congress appointed boards 
to consider aviation policy. In 1948 the two boards, not 
responsible for military policy as a whole, recommended 
that the Air Force be granted 70 groups. 26 After consider-
ing the plans of al l three services, t he administration did 
not concur with thi s recommendation. A compromise of a 55 
group program for the Air Force and m~T for the Army was 
proposed for the fiscal year 1949. This plan was recommended 
25. Forrestal, ££• cit., p 378. 
26. Ibid. 
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to Congress in the budget submitted early in 1948. 27 
The administration's program bogged down, and when 
Secretary of the Air Force Symington and General Spatz, 
Chief of Staff of the Air Force, appeared before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, they stated that 55 groups were 
not adequate and asked for the 70 groups. This opened up a 
host of new budgetary questions.28 
The budget came under formal consideration by the 
House Appropriations Committee early in April. With the 
Air Force representatives on record as favoring a larger 
air force than the budget called for, Representative 
Vinson, the ranking minority member of the Armed Services 
Committee, acted to secure additional funds. He succeeded 
in amending the budget to provide an additional 822 million 
dollars for the extra air units. In this effort he was 
joined by Representatives Kilday and Lyndon Johnson. 29 
As usual, Representative Vinson had gauged the temper 
of his cohorts correctly. With the U1fl bill bottled up in 
the House Rules Committee, Congress accepted the strength-
ening of the Air Force as an apparent preparedness substi-
tute. The House approved the extra funds by a vote of 
343 to 3.30 
27. Ibid, p 401. 
28. Ibid. 
-
29. Ibid, p 412 ff. 
30. Ibid. Also Con~ressional Di~est, Jan. 1949. 
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With the House on record the administration altered 
its plan to provide 66 air groups instead of 55. The 
aircraft for the additional 11 groups were to be obtained 
qy bringing old planes out of storage. This would curtail 
the extra expense and leave money for UMT. The Senate did 
not approve this plan. Senator Bridges, who was Chairman 
of the Appropriations Committee as well as a member of the 
Armed Services Committee, succeeded in having the budget 
considered before the UMT provision was heard in the .Armed 
Services Committee. The Senate provided the Air Force with 
an additional 822 million dollars to equip the extra groups 
with new aircraft. The appropriations bill passed by -
Congress gave the President authority to defer spending the 
extra money. This he did and at the end of the year the 
Air Force had 59 groups instead of ?o .31 
The following year Chairman Vinson introduced an 
organization bill to force the expansi on of the Air Force 
to ?0 groups. When the Armed Service r~ Gormn.i ttee Hearings 
opened, the President's budget for fiscal year 1950 had 
already gone to the Appropriations Committee. The budget 
31. Ibid., pps 419,425 ft:, 438. Also N. Y. Times, May 10, 
1948. Congressional ~uarterly Almanac, Vol V, 1949 
reported that the 59 groups were under strength, p 
222. Senators Bridges and Hill, from the Armed Ser-
vices Committee,_ were both active in the effort to 
get these funds. See Huzar, ££· cit., p 181 tt. 
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called for a 48 group Air Force and UMT . The House Armed 
Services Committee ignored this recommendation and approved 
the 70 group organization. Further, Chairman Vinson stated 
that the 800 million dollars allocated for ID~ in the 
President's budget could provide the extra aircraft, since 
illJT would not pass anyway. The Armed Services Committee 
approved this thought unanimously and the House concurred. 
During this period, the Appropriations Committee again 
approved more Air Force funds than the President requested.32 
In the Senate the Air Force did not fare so well. 
The Appropriations Committee eliminated the extra Air Force 
funds, and the Armed Services Conm1ittee, while authorizing 
70 groups, did not make the figure mandatory.33 
vVhen the Appropriations bill went to the Conference 
Committee, the House managers insisted that the Air Force 
receive extra money and they eventuall y prevailed. The 
funds were never spent. President Truman impounded them, 
much to the distress of the members of the House Armed 
32. Forrestal, £E• cit., p 546; N.Y. Times, for months 
of Jan.-Mar. 1949; and Congressional ~uarterly Almanac, 
Vol V, 1949, p 220 fr. Chairman Vinson also fought 
for more money for Naval Aviation but was unsuccessful 
in getting all he felt was necessary. 
33. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1 949, p 223 ff, p 499. 
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Services Conmli ttee. 34 
The legislative proposal to provide for 70 groups did 
not reach a Conference Committee until the following year. 
In 1950 the Conference Committee reported o~t a bill which 
basically provided for the 70 groups, but by July 1 the Ko-
rean War had started and such discussions were primarily 
of interest to historians.35 
Consideration of the Air Force cannot be dropped without 
mention of the Air Force Organization Bill of 1951. One aim 
of this bill was to reduce the growing duplication by the 
Air Force of administrative and supply functions available 
from the other services. The hearings on this bill are note-
worthy for the ease with which the Air Force views on the 
above functions and the need for flexible organization 
prevailed. 
In the hearings the Air Force stated that it did not 
wish to be a second class service and be forced to depend 
on someone else for its housekeeping. Also, it did not 
---------------------------------------------------------34. Ibid. See also Huzar, ££• cit., p 191 ff. A number of 
remarks were made during the B-36 Hearings concerning 
the President thwarting the will of Congress and the 
people by his impounding of the funds to expand the Air 
Force. No record is available of the stand taken within 
the Conference Committee by the Senate managers who 
were members of the Armed Services Committee. 
35. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1949 and 1950. 
36. In addition to t he question of services the Air Force 
was opposed to any legislation but accepted the idea 
at the insistence of the Committee that the service 
must have an organization prescribed in legislation, 
other than merely the 1947 Unifica tion Act. 
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desire to have branches established or specific organization 
that might restrict its flexibility. Surprisingly, this 
view largely prevailed. Chairman Vinson and others agreed 
with the thought that the Air Force, as a young service, 
needed its flexibil i ty and ovm services .37 So different 
was Chairman Vinson ' s attitude from that held during the 
Army organization hearings that it caused comment from 
Representative Cole and other members of the Committee. 38 
Nevertheless, the l i beral view prevail ed and the Air Force 
achieved an organization with greater administrative flex-
ibility than the other services possessed. In the Senate 
the matter largely went unchallenged. 39 
The Air Force, although junior in years, does not 
lag in the esteem of the legislators. 
----------------------------------------------------------37. Full Committee Hearings on HR 1726 Organization of the 
Air Force and the Department of t he Air Force, 82nd 
Congress, 1st Session, USGPO, 1951, p 144 
38. Ibid., p 145. 
39. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Armed Services, 82nd Congress, lst Session, on HR 
1726, USGPO, 1951. 
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NAVY 
The third of the volunteer services, the Navy, was not 
forgotten. From 1946, when Chairman Vinson, of the old 
Naval Affairs Committee, joined Chairman Walsh, his opposite 
number in the Senate, in backing the Navy's position on 
unification, the Navy has had friends at court.40 
Favor for the Navy is more difficult to show than for 
the Marines or Air Force, since no specifically Navy 
organization bills have been considered since 194?.41 
Despite this, two incidents demonstrate legislative esteem 
for the Navy, the 1947 Unification Act and the B-36 hearings. 
A brief examination of the 194? Act shows the prevalence 
of the Navy's view of the Secretary of Defense as a coordin-
ator rather than commander. The unification plan adopted 
was the Navy plan slightly modified. Naval Air was speci-
fically protected by law from inroads by the Air Force. 
The new harness rested lightly on the Navy. 
The tightening of the budget in 1949 made the harness 
of unification too tight for the Navy, just as it caused 
friction between the Legislative and Executive Branches of 
Government on the ?0 group Air Force question. The Navy 
40. See Chapter II. 
41. The basic Navy legislation occurred in 1946 prior to 
the reorganizat i on of Gongress. 
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lost its :projected flush deck carrier to Secretary ~ohnson's 
economy drive. 
Following the c arrier decision, an anonymous charge 
was a ired that there had been im:pro:per acts in the Air Forces 
B-36 :procurement :pro gram. ·,Nhile this charge was making 
headlines, further questions were raised by certa in Naval 
officers about the efficacy of the B-36 and the Air Force's 
entire strategic bombing concept. 
Such serious charges drew demands from Representative 
Van Zandt, a Naval Heserve Officer, and others, for in-
vestigat ion and action. The char ge of improper actions in 
the B-36 procurement matter was shortly disposed of a s 
false. The second question was not resolved so easily and 
extensive hearings were held. These hearings spanned the 
entire question of t he nation's strategy and the missions 
of the different services. 
Through this broad span one central theme runs, the 
Committee's concern for the Navy. This concern, based on 
allegations of low morale in the fleet and of emasculation 
of the Navy's striking force, shows in the statements of 
the legislators. Cha irmen Vinson asked Admiral Denfield 
wha t the Committee could do to affirm the Navy 's role in 
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national defense and remove its anxieties. Vfuen the AdD~iral 
compla ined tha t the Navy was being controlled and dominated 
by the Army and Air E'orce, his statement was endorsed by 
Representative Short, who indic a ted the Committee -vvas sympa-
thetic to the Navy's problems. Representative Cole saw in 
the situation a creeping plan to adopt the Collins concept 
of one overall general staff. Representative Sassecer wor-
ried about the combat functions of the Navy being "dried up" 
in defiance of the unification law which prohibited change 
of combat functions from one service to another. 42 Indeed, 
so apparent was the Navy bias of many Committee members that 
Representative Rivers took pains to assure Secretary Syming-
ton, when he appeared as a witness, that the Comn1ittee was 
not anti-Air Force. 43 
No spectacula r legislative program grew out of the in-
cident. A carefully dra~ report and a new Chief of Naval 
Operations were the only tangible results of the Navy's 
day in court. There were two other important results of 
an intangible nature. First, the Navy definitely estab-
-
lished the existence of a favorable audience. Had the 
42. B-36 Hearings, 2E• cit., various pagings. The Collins 
plan, Rep. Cole referred to, was an early version of 
the Army's unification plan. It was discarded before 
the unification matter crune before Congress. 
43. Ibid., p 436. 
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Korean War not resulted in the complete repudiation of 
Secretary Johnson's economy program, t hat backing might 
have been of critical importance in fut ure budget cons iq-
erations. Second, the Committee's report contained certain 
military policy recommendations for some very necessary 
i mprovements. This matter will be discussed in the final 
chapter of this thes is. 44 
SUM])IA.RY AND EXPLANATION 
What of the Army? While individual legislators have 
spoken up for the s enior service on occasion, they have 
been in the minoritJr• There has been insufficient support 
to gain much favorable legislation f or the non-volunteer 
service. 
The Marines, Ai r Force, and Navy have enjoyed favored 
status. What is the basis of this f avoritism and what has 
been the effect? 
The favorable l egislative position of the volunteer 
services stems from the roots of public opinion. ~Vhen 
entering the service , young men may indicate their prefer-
ence for the Navy, Marines, or Air Force. While on active 
44. Unification Report, ££· cit., Adm. Denfield was re-
placed as CNO due to his obvious di sagreements with 
the policies of his superiors. This decision had been 
taken even befor e the hearings alt hough it caused a 
great deal of di stress in Congressional circles. 
duty the volunteer is less disposed to complain than the 
draftee. The alumni of the three volunteer services are 
generally less bitter the.n the Army veterans who, from 
no choice of their own, had many of the least pleasant 
jobs and took the bulk of the casualties.45 Tradition-
al+y, the Army is regarded by many as militaristic and 
a danger to civil liberties.46 
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The Committee members know the public's sentiments e.nd 
respect their strength. Further, the Congressmen receive 
more complaints, both proportionally and numerically, from 
the Army. 47 Finally, the Committeemen are basically a 
part of the public themselves and therefore reflect public 
attitudes, if only subconsciously. 
Another reason for the legislative position on the 
volunteer services is the controversial political problems 
that the Army has sponsored, such as Selective Service and 
45. Official casualty figures for Korea to include May 11, 
1951 totaled 65,523 broken down as follows: Army, 
54,416; Navy, 691; Marines, 9,831; and Air Force, 585. 
46. Swisher, ~· cit., pps 791, 794. 
47. See for example the House Reserve Hearings, .!?.E.• cit. 
All the complaining letters included in the recora-
were from Army personnel. 
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UMT. Although Chairman Vinson and his committee may be-
lieve personally in UMT, they may be forced to adopt the 
?0 group Air Force program as a measure which has a chance 
of success on the floor. 
The effects of such a system are :many. Three are 
important: the duplication of effort between the services, 
maldistribution of' personnel, and the influence on strategy. 
In the field of duplication several items exist. The 
Air Force has built up a self-contained supply force, dupli-
cating services already in existence in the Army and Navy. 
Naval aviation and its Marine component continue to dupli-
cate many Air Force functions. The Marine divisions, which 
are to form the first shield of the nation in the eyes of 
the public, duplicate the missions being handled by certain 
Army units. Certainly such duplication would indicate that 
the preference for the volunteer serv·ices is a luxury. 
More serious than the duplication is the maldistribu-
tion of personnel, as noted by General Nelson in World War 
II. With three services allowed to pick and choose their 
personnel, the Army is forced to take what is left for the 
draft. As a result, many individuals are not utilized to 
thedr maximum ability in the three preferred services, 
while the fourth service is forced to operate with less 
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qualified individuals in key spots.48 
La st, our strategy ha s been inclined towards increased 
dependence on strategic air war. To the extent that this 
is ba sed on proper evaluation of facts such decisions are 
sound. To the extent that such decisions rest on Congres-
sional and public approbation of the different services, 
the results are unfortunate. The exact weight of each 
f actor depends on high level decisions and cannot be known. 
The tremendous shortage of ground troops during the Korean 
War suggests that a t least some of t he decisions were 
unfortunate.4g 
In summary, Congress ha s a dist l nct preference for the 
volunteer services . That pref erence i s due to the reflection 
of public opinion by Congress and Congressional Committees. 
Finally, that preference has certa in unfortunate results in 
the fields of mili t ary organization f nd strategy. 
-------------------------------------·-----------------------48. N. Y. Times, Feb. 1g, 1g51, Sen. J~yndon Johnson's Sub-
committee hit the Air ]'orce for 11 skimming off the cream" 
of the recruit s saying, "Men of high i ntelligence who 
might have made invaluable officers for the Ar my a re now 
consigned to t he ranks of the Air Force as privates. " 
v\lha t such a system can lead to was pointed out by a for-
mer German officer in a personal conversation in a 
bitter denunciation of the volunteer system that allowed 
the Luftwaffe and SS to skim off t he cream of the man-
power in Germany. He emphasized t he increased casual-
ties taken in the bulk of the Germa n Army due to the 
lowering of l eadership standards. · ' 
4g. Forrestal, ££· cit., devotes a g: eat deal of space to 
the difficulties of getting suff:ic ient surface forces 
to do t h e jobs r equired in the f ac e of the enthusia sm 
f or a ir power. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SP ECIAL INTEREST GROUPS 
. AND 
UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING 
"To provide f'or the common defense." Certainly such 
a legisla tive obje·ctive will arouse t he interest of the 
diverse groups that furnish the millions of men in the 
Armed Forces. The activities the special interest groups · 
undertake in attempting to advance t heir particular views, 
"lobbying", are a logic al outgrowth Ct f this interest. To 
reconcile the views of these groups i. s one of the political 
t a sks of our national government. 
The words "lobbying" and "lobbiets " often have a poor 
connotation in da i ly usage. They bri ng to mind the picture 
of someone obtaini ng something to whj.ch he is not entitled 
from the common trea sury. Such is not necessarily the case. 
Dr. Belle Zeller, a long-time studeni; of this subject, ha s 
expressed the thought that legitimatB lobbying, above board, 
can be a valuable expression of view:3.1 In addition, 
lobbying serves a s a source of infonnation for the legisla -
' ) 
tors and acts as a watchdog service. '"' These functions will 
be served in military organization b:Ll ls as in all other 
legislation. 
------------------------------------·-----------------------
1. As reported i n Congressional Dig,9st, May 1~53. 
2. American Politics and the Party :3ystem by Hugh A. Bone, 
McGraw-Hill, 1~47, p 242 ff. 
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The questions to be answered he~e are: What lobbies 
are concerned and what do:. they do? 'Nhat questions o:f mil-
itary organization arouse their interest? What are their 
relations with the committees and the administration? 
Vfuat are the implications for National Security? 
Four major groups are considered generally to possess 
political power: business, labor, agriculture, and veter-
ans.3 These groups all have a stake in military organiza-
tion. A number of semi-professional military groups also 
step forward to have their say whenev·er military matters 
are discussed. Finally, various lesE: powerful lobbies, 
such as religious and educational grc,ups, and civilian 
professional societies, occasionally find questions o:r 
military organization of interest. 'l~ese latter groups 
will not be discussed. 
Business is represented mainly by two organizations, 
the National Associa tion o:r Manu:facturers and the Chamber 
of Commerce. Both have ancillary organizations and take 
a conservative line. Their political power comes :from the 
large amount o:f funds rather than the votes at their disposal. 
Business' interest in military affaiJ:-s is primarily in the 
effect of military expenditures on the tax rate.4 
-----------------------------------------------------------3. Swisher, ££• cit., p 207. 
4. Party and Pressure Politics by Dayton D. McKean, Houghton 
Mi:fflin Company, 1949, p 482 f:f; also Bone,~· cit., p 
105 ff, and Politics, Parties, ru1d Pressure Groups by 
:i. 0. Key, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1952, p 86 :r:r. 
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Labor is represented by the AF.L, the CIO, and some 
major independents such as the TJMVV an d the railroad unions. 
Their power lies i n political fund r e.ising and in their 
claimed ability to influence more th ~:m 25,000,000 votes. 5 
Their interest is aroused whenever t !Le civilian manpower 
pool is mentioned, since the members of that pool are either 
actual or potential dues-paying trade union members.6 
The farmers of the country exeroise their power through 
,. 
the Grange, Farmers Union, American Jrarm Bureau Federation 
and the National Council of Farmer C()operatives. Unlike 
the business and labor interests, the farmers possess direct 
political influence on a national le,rel through the "farm 
bloc". 7 As with labor, the farmers are interested in 
questions involving the manpower poo1 . 8 
The fourth major group is the vet erans. The .American 
Legion, commonly regarded as the mos·~ powerful lobby in 
existence, and t he Veterans of Foreign Wars lead these 
organizations. Their strength comes f rom the more than 
5. McKean, .QE.• .£.it., p 464 and Key, .21?.• cit., p 75 ff. 
6. Bone, .9.£• cit_., p 138 ff; -Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social ;3cience, Sept. 1948, 
p 146; Forrestal, £2· cit., p 405. 
7. :McKean, .2.£.• cit., p 457 ff. 
8. Bone, .9.£. cit. , p 155 ff. 
5,000,000 votes the organizations can claim and from the 
a stuteness of their legislative agents. 9 Many matters of 
69 
military organization are of interest to the veterans as an 
alumni group, but the questions that strike closest to home 
are those concerned vrl th manpower. 
Of narrower political power than the four groups just 
mentioned, but possessing some influence in relation to 
military legislation, are certa in semi-professional military 
groups. These draw their strength from non-active duty 
personnel of the .1\ rmed Fore es for whom the military profes-
sion is an avocation. Included in this group are the Na-
tional Guard Association, the Reserve Officers Association, 
the Havy League, and the Air Force Association. The first 
represents the modern "militia" officers and bases its 
power on the eloquence of its Wa shington representa tives 
and its contact with the various stat.e administrations. 
The Reserve Officers Association repr·esents reserve officers 
of all four services and is influential primarily because 
of its legislative representatives. The Navy League attracts 
varied membership including both nav~::.l personnel and busi-
ness interests. The Air Force Association is similar in 
9. Key,.££.· cit., p 124; gives credit to the legislative 
agents; McKean, 2J2.• cit., p 510 :ef, credits American 
Legion with influence over 3,000 ,,000 plus votes and 
the VFW vnth 2,000,000 plus; Sam Stavisky supports 
the ab'ove figures and particularly compliments the 
VFW legislative representative in Annals,~· cit., 
p 128 ff. 
organization to the Navy League and is influential due to 
both the stature of its leaders a nd the strength of its 
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business backing . The interests of t hese groups are many, 
and frequently conflict, but they tend to center around 
matters concerning the reserve components of the services, 
their organization and manpower.10 
How do these special interest groups advance their 
interests'? There are three principal ways: by expressing 
their opinions to the legislators, b:r spreading their view-
point, and by supporting friends and opposing enemies. 
Legislative agents present group views to Congressmen in 
committee hearings and by contacting i ndividual legislators. 
The hearings are particularly effective because they act 
directly on the Congressmen writing t he bill. In both cases, 
the force and the effectiveness of the legislative agents 
is of utmost importance. So significant are the efforts of 
these agents that it has been said, "The simple fact that a 
group is represented before Congress by skilled and aggres-
sive legislative strategists may bring it influence."11 
10. This information is compiled fro:m many sources includ-
ing the magazines Air Force and t he National Guardsman, 
the publications of the AFA and NGA respect~vely, 
information published at the Massachusetts NGA conven-
tion of 1953, comments from the New York Times, and 
The Lobbyists by Karl Schriftgriesser, Little, Brown 
and Company, 1951. 
11. V. o. Key in The Journal of Politics, Feb. 1943, p 39; 
this view is supported by E. E. Schattschneider in 
Annals, 2£· cit., p 1? ff. 
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The above approaches are not the only methods of 
contacting Congressmen. Telegrams and letters may be 
deluged on Washington. These message ::~ are not necessarily 
spontaneous, but even if they are partially discounted the 
1 '!:> group's attitude will be considered. '"" 
The second method of advancing gr oup interests is to 
spread the viewpoint. If enough people can be made to feel 
strongly about a subject the group objective will be ob-
tained. Therefore the educational function is not neglect-
ed. Groups such as labor, industry, and veterans have 
large sums of money to devote to educational activities.13 
The small '~rofessional" organizations also can be effective. 
For example, the Air FOrce Association is represented by a 
privately published magazine, Air For~, which presents the 
group viffi~oint.l4 Association members speak in support of 
the Thesis and their statements are publicized. An Associa-
tion director, General Carl Spatz (UI::AF ret.) , sets forth 
the group's view in Newsweek. Finally, the industrial mem-
bers spread the word, as when United Aircreft advertised 
12. Bone, .2.l2.• cit., p 234and Zeller, .Q.E.• cit., pointed 
out value of' grass roots campa~gn. 
• 13. King Legion by Marcus Duffield, Cape and Smith, 1931, 
p 298 ff gives a n example of the Legion effort in the 
publicity and educational field. 
14. An example is the strongly negative article on carrier 
task forces in the Dec. 1952 issue. 
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the Finletter Report in the New York Times.15 
The third method by which a group n1akes itself felt 
is by assisting its friends and oppo:3i.ng its enemies. 
This technique is bound up in the other two methods. The 
ability to assist and to oppose increa ses the effectiveness 
of the group's legislative agents. ~rhe educational activi-
ties of the group increase the effec·t i ve ability to assist 
and oppose. The most effective assis tance or opposition is 
at the polls. A guarantee of votes on election day can be 
a powerful stimulus. Whether those 'iVho claim large blocs of 
votes have the ability to deliver them is questionable, how-
ever.16 Further, matters of military organization seldom 
will be the governing factor in determining whether a 
legislator is supported. 
If a group cannot act at the polls it can give the 
legislator favorable or unfavorable publicity. For example, 
the Marine Corps ROA presented a medal to Representative 
Vinson in 1951 and the Air Force Association presented an 
award to Senator Lyndon Johnson in 1952.17 
15. As pointed out by Swisher,~· ~it., p 217. 
16. V. 0. Ke¥, ~· cit., p 80; same author in Politics, 
~. cit. , and McKean, .2.E.. cit. , p 520, both agree on 
this point. 
17 • .Army-Navy-Air Force Journal, Vol. LXXXVIII, p 483 and 
Vol. LXXXX, p 8. 
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The special interest groups do not operate on a one way 
street. Their interest in Congress is reciprocated. In addi-
tion, there are numerous conflicts of interest among the 
groups and with the administration. I ndeed, in the words of 
one observer, tt ••• Lobbying can be understood only a s the 
reflection of interests shered by shifting coalitions made up 
by members of Congress, outside pressures, end executive 
agencies ••• u18 
As examples of this interaction of interests we find 
tha t Representative Van Zandt, a former ne.tional commander 
of the VFN, was able to secure a statement from that organi-
zatlon supporting him in his opposi t j_on to unification. 19 
Similarly, Representative Towe requested the assistance of 
the .American Legion in securing support for the UMT bill in 
1948. 20 The Navy League and the Air Force Association have 
'"1 had continual conflicts of interest. '" The National Guard 
Association has found itself at odds vvi th certa in a dmin-
istration officials. 22 Last, but not least, the 
18. Prof. s . K. Bailey as set forth i n Hearings before the 
Select Committee on Lobbying Activities of the House of 
Representatives, 8lst Congress, _2nd Session, US GPO, 1950 
Part 1, p 41. 
19. Stavisky, ££• cit. 
20. New York Times, Aug. 27, 1948, 1:8. 
21. Ibid., Aug. 6, 1949, 6:2 and Oct. 7, 1951, 22:3. 
22. Ibid., l'viar. 27,1949, 9:2 and .Jun. 8,1949, 1:6. 
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administration has needed the suppor1:i of various groups to 
secure legislation. 23 
For an example of the various po sitions adopted by 
special interest groups, let us turn to the question of 
Universal Military Training (UMT). 
UNI'VERSAL MILITARY TRAINI NG 
Probably no proposal has been more debated since 
World War II. There have been discussions, hearings, or 
voting at each session of Congress on some form of military 
training. Simultaneously, the entire country has shown 
interest and expressed its opinion. 
The question is not one of manpower for the active 
forces, as Selective Service furnishes this when there are 
insufficient volunteers. The crux of the matter is the 
establishment of a permanent system of general training, 
designed for the long period of time:. 
A variety of' viewpoints has bee:n advanced. m,n is 
advocated as necessary to provide t he large numbers of 
23. Swisher, 2.l2.· cit., points out pe:ople outside the govern-
ment have the right to exert pressure, those within 
government do not have this right, p 222. Bone, .Q.E..cit., 
supports the view of the need for administrative 
of'ficials to secure public support for their programs 
if' they are to succeed, p 211. For specific examples 
Forrestal attempted to enlist tt'.e support or Labor for 
the UMT proposal in 1948, Forrestal, .££• cit., p 406 
and President Truman requested the support or the 
National Guard Association for tWT, Congressional 
Quarterly, Vol. VI, p 314. 
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trained men essential to military security, and is opposed 
as a military anachronism in the air age. History is cited 
to show the need for UMT, and, conver sely, to show that UMT 
would be un-American and militaristic. UMT is acvocated as 
necessary to support foreign policy e.nd is opposed as a 
measure that would turn the world age.inst us. A host of 
social debates has attached itself to the problem and the 
financial feasibility of the program also has been attacked. 
The issue was formally introduced by President Truman 
in 1947, based on the recomm.endationB of a special advisory 
commission headed by Dr. Karl T. Compton of Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. A subcommi·:; t ee of the House Arr.a.ed 
Services Committee, headed by Repres t:~ntative Towe, held 
hearings on the President's recommendations and reported 
the bill favorably to the full comm.it; ·tee at the end of 
cTuly. 24 That hearings were held at all represented a 
considerable degr·ee of progress agai:1s t the opposition. 
Only by agreeing to limit consideration to committee hear-
ings without action on the House floor , was the committee 
able to make even that much progress.25 
The full Armed Services Committee reported the bill to 
the House a few days later. 26 This was the first time a 
-----------------------------------------------------------24. Times, cTu1. 20' 1947, 1:6 and cTu1. 12, 1947, 11:3. 
25. Ibid., cTun. 25, 1947, 32:5. 
26. Ibid., cTu1. 26, 1947, 11:3. 
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congressional conmlittee ever reported a UMT bill favorably. 
It is not to be thought, however, that the bill received 
unanimous support. 
Several opposition groups are worth mentioning. A. s. 
Goss of the National Grange expressed the views of the farm 
organizations when he opposed tn,~ as bad psychologically, 
both at home and abroad, and as the wrong way to compete 
with the Russians. 27 Harry See of the Railroad Brotherhoods 
attacked the financial aspects of the bill. 28 ~vo influ-
ential authorities, Hanson Baldwin of the ~York Times 
and Josephus Daniels, the former Secretary of the Navy, 
questioned the mi.li tary efficacy, the historical necessity, 
and the cost of the program. 29 Several committee members 
reserved the right to oppose the bill on the floor. 30 
------------------------------------·-----------------------27. The Congressional Digest, Oct. 1947, p 249. During the 
period 1947 to 1950, the farm organizations listed 
anti-UMT literature as a part o :J~ their $142,694 
expenditures for printing. Report of the House Select 
Comrni ttee on Lobbying Activities, House of Representa-
tives, Slst Cong, 2nd Session, JI:xpendi tures by Farm 
and Labor Organizations to Influence Legislation, 
USGPO, 1951, p 10. 
28. Ibid., p 251. 
29. Ibid., p 243 and p 247. 
30. Ibid., p 256. 
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As agreed in advance by the Hous e of Representatives, 
the bill was not t o be acted on by the House until the next 
year. In preparation for this fight the American Legion 
launched a telegram campaign in suppor t of UMT and attempt-
ed to rebut anti-TJMT editorials throughout the country. 31 
Secretaries Forrestal and M:arshall consul ted with Congress-
men and Senators and opposition grou:?s. 32 
Unhappily for the chances of pa3sage a number of out-
side influences were present. First, the reports of the 
Presidential and Congressional Air p ,::>wer Commissions offered 
an apparent alternative. 33 Second, i t was an election year. 
The words of the politically wise we:re, "Won't pass in 
election year since it will be too unpopular (expensive, 
compulsion)". 34 The words were well chosen. The bill did 
not reach the floor. 
The years 1949 and 1950 were quiet on the ill...1T front. 
Military forces were cut back until June, 1950, and the 
center of interest was air power. The House Committee, 
led by IIr. Vinson, devoted its endeavors to securing a 
31. Congressional Q.uarterly, Vol. III, p 310. 
32. Forrestal, 
.9.:£. cit., pps 243, 384, 399, 406. 
33. Congressional Disest, Jan. 1949, and Forrestal, 2E· 
cit., p 3?? ff. 
34. Congressional Di6est, Oct. 194?, p 225. 
70-group Air Force, using money previously earmarked ~or 
UMT. 35 
While 1949 and the ~irst half of 1950 were too quiet 
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to consider tTh[T, the last half of 1950 was too busy. Com-
mitted to a war in Korea, the administration and Congress 
were involved in emergency measures and found little time 
to consider long range programs. 
In 1951 Congress again considered IDAT. The adminis-
tration presented a bill covering the entire present and 
future manpower situation, the Universal Military Service 
and Training Act. Since this is the only UMT type bill 
ever passed by t he Congress, its coiJ.sideration is particu-
larly important. 
The bill, advocated by the Defe:nse Department, called 
~or a permanent program, under which all young men would 
receive six months training, with a·_ditional active service 
up to 27 months a s required by the v.rorld situation. Fol-
lowing training and active service, t hey would be assigned 
to the reserve forces for an additional period. 
Tne bill was considered simult€meously by the House 
Committee and the Senate Committee' E: Preparedness Subcommi t-
tee, headed by Senator Lyndon Johnson. Every conceivable 
35. Times, Jan. 30, 1949; Forrestal, ££• cit., p 421, 
426 ~f. Vinson stated that since UD:IT would not pass, 
the money might as well be used for the Air Force and 
when Forrestal backed the extra AF money, ln>~ was 
completely out of the picture. 
viewpoint was sought in the effort to develop an enduring 
manpower base. In the words of Sena~:; or Johnson, 
"For a l ong time we have d 1~alt with manpower 
piecemeal; we have improvised our solutions to man-
power problems day to day. Thi ;:; is a luxury we can 
no longer indulge. The manpowe:r programs we under-
take now must be geared to a co:n.tinuing struggle of 
ten years or more if they are to be at all adequate. 
The time has i::gme when we must look: beyond the end 
of our nose."~ 
In the House, Chairman Vinson led off with a similar 
statement of need for an enduring syst em.37 
The initial hearings were auspicious. Assistant 
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Secretary of Defense Rosenberg was able to sta te tha t the 
bill had the support of the CIO, the AFL, and certain 
educational organizations, groups that had always opposed 
ID,fl. 38 Of course, she did not claim unqualified support, 
but rather stated support of the "principle". 39 In con-
firmation, 1~ . Carey, of the CIO, appeared before the 
Senate committee, suggested several amendments in the bill, 
but made no criticism of the m~rr principle. 40 
36. Hearings before the Preparedness Subcommittee of the 
Conmrlttee on Ar.med Services, United States Senate, 82nd 
Congress, lst Session, on S-1, USGPO, 195~, p 23, 
hereafter cited as Senate ~~ Hearings 1951. 
37. House U:MT Hearings 1951, .2J?.. cit .• 
38. Ibid., p 171 ff. 
39, Ibid. 
40. Senate UiviT Hearings 1951, .££• cit., p 1051. 
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The bill was supported also by the veter ans' organizations, 
the Chamber of Commerce, and the reserve organizations. 41 
0~ the major interest groups only the far.m organizations 
opposed the mea sure.42 With such backing it appeared that 
the bill could not f ail to pass. 
These hearings took place during t he month of January, 
1951. The Senate hearings ended Febr~ary 2 and the initial 
House hearings ended. February 8. In Korea the Chinese Com-
munists, after dri ving our ~orces from North Korea in Nov-
ember and December of 1950, attacked again during the first 
week in January and drove our forces below the Han. During 
the early part of J anuary, there was a question in many 
minds a s to whether the Chinese would be stopped short of 
Pusan, if at all. 
In the last half of January, the Eighth United States 
Army in Korea turned on its pursuers and drove them back to 
the North. A Chine s e countero~fensiYe in the l atter part 
o~ February was cont ained and crushed and Seoul was retaken 
in the early part of March. In shor··~ , the military situa -
tion changed from darkest gloom to a picture of comparative 
light. 
41. Ibid., pps 1025 , 701, 1121, 726, 714. 
42. Ibid., p 873, The Grange was the principal farmer's 
organization. 
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The Senate's bi ll came to the House at the end of 
February. By this t ime the improved s ituation in Korea had 
made itself generally felt. A feeling arose that a perman-
ent system of mili t a ry training was no longer necessary. 
So serious was the emotion that Secr~~tary of Defense Marshall 
felt constrained to appear again before the House Committee 
in support of the l egislation and in opposition to the "boom 
and bust" preparedness philosophy. 43 He was followed by a 
series of government witnesses. 
More than government support was necessary, of course. 
The com.mittee, sens i tive to the need f or public support of 
such a bill, invited a host of privaiie citizens and groups 
to testify. The t es timony of the CIO representative in 
discussing the tit l e of the bill indicates the public change 
in sentiment. Before the Senate in ~ranuary he had said, 
"It smacks of national service legisl ation, which not one 
of us would want to see replace the voluntary free labor 
which has so successfully served the nation in previous 
periods of peace and war. The Selective Service Act of 
1948 should be extended with the title intact."44 
Bet'ore the House Committee the ~::a.me sentence read, 
43. House ID£r Hearings 1951, 2£• cit., p 436. 
44. Senate U1vlT Hearings 1951, .2.£• cit~ ., p 1051. 
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"The Selective Servi ce Act of 1948 should be extended with 
the title intact and all references :in the bill to estab-
--- ·----
li shmen t of ~ National Security Trai:~ing Corps (Ul.fi rmi t) 
should be eliminated . n 45 (nnderlini:1g and parenthesis mine} 
Similarly, the AFL, which had not testified in the Senate 
hearings, advocated the bill only fo:r the duration of' the 
emergency. 46 
Chair.man Vinson, an experienced legislative architect 
who sensed the rising opposition, which included some mem-
bers of his own committee, presented a compromise to the 
House. 47 The bill s et up UMT machinery. Its operation 
depended on Congressional approval of a detailed plan which 
would be prepared by the National Security Training Connn.is-
sion, an organization established by ·the bill. 
The events of 1951 show very clearly the public's 
quick forgetfulness end make the eve.nts of' 1952 readily 
predictable, since the Korean war, although still active, 
was operating on a greatly reduced scale with peace talks 
in progress. 
---------------------------------------------------------45. House UMT Hearings 1951, ££• cit., p ?83. 
46. Ibid., p 879. 
47. Congressional Quarterly, Bol. VII, p 282, states that 
Reps. Arends, Short, and Norblad of' the Committee all 
opposed. Ar.my-Navy-Air Force Journal, Vol. LXXXXVIII, 
p 890, reported the compromise and on p 863 reported 
the f'loor with Vinson f'or and Short leading the 
opposition. 
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When the members of the National Security Training 
Commission presented their plan to the House Committee, it 
was well received. Even such an arch-opponent of m~ as 
Representative Short professed to be: swayed by the logic 
of the arguments and Chaim.an Vinson said, "They made a 
strong case."48 After hearing the commission members and 
the representatives of the Defense Department, the committee 
heard the opponents of the m,u principle. The CIO reiter-
ated its disapproval of the previous: year in strong fashion 
and the AFL said it was no longer able to support the 
idea.49 The farm organizations expressed their strong 
opposition to a permanent program which would take young 
men out of farm production. 50 Many religious and reform 
organizations registered dissent. 
These objections did not prevent a bill from being 
reported out. Chairman Vinson had :prefaced the hearings 
with the statement that the mission was to examine the UMT 
plan, not the UMT .E,rinciple, which b.ad been approved the 
year before. 5l The committee favorably reported the bill 
48. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, House 
of Reuresentatives, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, on HR 
5904, USGPO, 1952, pps 2349 and 2351, hereafter cited 
as House U:MT Hearings 1952. 
49. Ibid., p 2638 and p 2631. 
50. Ibid., pps 2504, 2507, and 2485. 
51. Ibid., p 2301. 
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to the floor but that was all. The Congressional Quarterly 
reported, 
"Arguments from a variety of pressure groups also 
were presented to Congressmen. Most of this pressure 
was against UMT; In general, veterans and reserve groups 
favored UMT; farm, labor, religi.ous, education and 
'Peace' groups opposed it. Few ma jor business groups 
were heard from. The Chamber o::t.' Commerce of the United 
States, for instance, merely told Congressmen that the 
National Chamber had decided to 'withhold' support of 
pending bills. The Chamber g~ Commerce had supported 
lThiT continual ly since 1915." 
The bill was returned to committee, i.ts death sentence. 
To draw general conclusions from the foregoing discus-
sion of UMT, certain li..rniting considerations and assumptions 
must be accepted. 
First, more people are interested in manpower proposals 
than in any other. With the possible exception of business 
interests, all the major lobbies and a host of minor ones 
are directly affected by manpower procurement. The question 
touches the lives of people even more: directly than a tax 
stab at the pocketbook. It is unlikely that other military 
organization proposals will arouse interest group activity. 
52. Congressional Quarterly, Vol. VIII, p 199. The 
ve:beran' s support on this issue i.s open to question. 
V. 0. Key, as cited in Journal o:f' Politics, pointed 
out the inabili t y of the veteran~:; to deliver the 
cla i med votes. Stavisky, ££• cii~., stated that the 
Legion leaders in demanding UMT clo not have the 
support of the raru( and file. 
Second, m.1T is a sound proposition. The respons ible 
military and civil cldministrators have a dvoc a ted it. The 
Congressional Committee char ged with i nvestiga ting the 
proposa l have three times favorably reported UMT to t he 
floor . 
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Third, lobbi es did have direct beari ng on the f inal 
decision . In a six year period, a Ul.riT proposel succeeded 
only when l abor's opposition wa s partially vvi thdravm, 
t h ereby upsetting t h e ba l ance of l abor and agriculture 
against veterans' groups. Vlhen l abor again r ose in opposi-
tion, m ..rT was throvm anew into the discard. 
With the above f actors in mind the following conclu-
sions can be dravm. 
The lobbies can be more effective on the House and 
Senate a s a whole , than on the Armed Services Committees, 
a s shovm by the repeated failures of Congress to support 
their committees on the UMT issue. Eiince the comrlli ttees 
are cross sections of their respective houses t he distinc-
tion probably stems from the difference in knowledge of 
the subject . 
The Ar med Services Conrrnittees understand military 
subjects and needs. If a r guments a r e spurious, one-sided or 
da ted, the committees have the necessary f acts to refute 
them. 53 
Unfortunately, legislators outside the committees do 
not have all these facts at their fingertips. When they 
are faced with the a rguments of powerful lobbies, they do 
not have the information with which to eva lua te them. 
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Certainly the legislator, without the facts, may accept the 
one-sided picture presented by a spec:i a l interest group. 
In snmmary, those vd th all the : ~e.cts can act more 
rationally than those with only a paJ::-t of the picture. For 
both the military adm.inistra tor and -~he Armed Services 
Cormni ttees a major task is to inform t hose who make 
decisions, whether legislators or vo-~ers. 
----------------------------------------------------------53. House UMT Hearings 1952, .2E.• ..£11. , p 2349, Rep. Rivers 
said that the information given :1im by the members of 
the Nationa l Security Training Ct:>nlllission in the 
hearings corrected a great deal e> f "misinforma tion" 
given him by religious representatives. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is well at this point to exruai ne the record of the 
six year period, and to determine if there is any pattern 
to the events. 
To my mind such a pattern exist:;. There have been 
marked differences of opinion between the Legislative 
Branch, which the Armed Services Co~nittees largely repre-
sent in defense matters, and the Execluti ve Branch. 
From the very beginning of the J?eriod under discussion 
the two Committees have not seen eye t o eye with the Execu-
tive Branch. In 1947 they showed th1dr distrust for the 
Executive Branch by limiting the DefE~nse Secretary's powers 
and by specifying the functions of the Marines in the basic 
unification law. In 1948 they demanded a 70 group Air 
Force. In 1949 t hey repeated their clemand for the larger 
Air Force, in preference to UMT, and fUrther differed over 
the power and authority to be vested in the Secretary of 
Defense and the Chairman of the JCS. In 1950, until the 
Korean War broke out, the Committees were reluctant to 
extend Selective Service.1 In 1951 and 1952 the Committees 
1. Initially the leaders of the HouBe Committee were very 
lukewarm as in January war did not appear imminent and 
it was felt that the Army should rely on volunteers. 
Finally, in June the Committee docided to go along with 
the extension , but to keep the power to implement 
supported the Marine Corps bill, oppcsing the views of the 
administration. All things considered, it could hardly be 
said tha t the Committees were in complete agreement with 
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the administration's military program. The question is, why? 
The answer does not lie in party politics. The Commit-
tees' considerations have been singularly free of partisan 
statements.la Legislation drew either opposition or support 
from legislators on an individual basis. 
Part of the answer may be found in an examination of 
the personalities involved. Secretary Johnson's complete 
refusal to consult with the legislators, his economies 
which the Cornmi ttees regarded as tmvd.se, and his brusque 
manner, all caused the Committees to distrust the Executive 
proposals. Proper selection of personnel could avoid such 
personality clashes, but this would not solve the whole 
problem. Secretaries Marshall and Lovett were held in high 
regard by the Committees and Secretary Forrestal made great 
efforts to get along with Congress. In spite of this, the 
administration's Air Force program was repudiated during 
Secretary Forrestal's term as Secretary of Defense. Secre-
taries I\Iarshall and Lovett suffered nimilar defeats. 
------------------------------------------------------~----draf'ting in the hands o:r CongresB. The matter ceased 
to be important with the invasion of Korea. Hearings 
before the Committee on Armed Services, House of 
Representatives, 8lst Congress, gnd Session on HR 6826. 
l.a. As an example when Rep. Price, a Democrat, commented 
that Sec. Johnson was a victim o :~ a Republican economy 
drive, Chairman Vinson (D), Rep. Rivers (D) and Rep. 
Cole (R) all protested interject:mg politics into 
defense matters. 
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Does the answer lie in governmental organiza tion? 
Certa inly the division of responsibilities between the 
Executive and Legislative Branches makes cooperation and 
coordination difficult. The history of our foreign policy 
demonstra tes some of the difficulties and at least one 
solution. During World War II, the Committee of Eight 
formed a valuable bridge between the Senate and the 
a dministra tion in t h is field. 2 A similar establishment 
in the defense field would undoubtedly help to secure a 
meeting of the minds between the two branches of govern-
ment.3 The establishment of such an organization can be 
undertaken only by the Executive Bra:n.ch. That point 
leads to the heart of the problem. 
2. The Committee of Eight was a grou.p of eight Sena tors 
dravm from both parties who met with the Secretary 
of State in 1944 and 1945 to discus s post war policies. 
The Committee was formed at the :::uggestion of Secre-
tary of State Hull who wished to avoid the executive-
legisla tive split that had occurred after Horld vVar I. 
The functioning of this group demonstrates a high 
spot in coordination of effort between the two branches 
and the succeeding period is marked by such diplomatic 
successes as the United Nations formation, the Harshell 
Pl an, Aid to Greece and others. This period also 
demonstrated the need for executlve initia tive. 
Senator Vandenberg had attempted t o coopera te in the 
foreign relations field earlie1~ ln the vmr and had 
been turned down by the administre.tion. See · 
Vandenberg , ~· cit., for descriJ>t ion of events. 
3. In the report of the B-36 hearings the House Armed Ser-
vices Comraittee found that there wa s insufficient liai-
son vvi th the Appropriations and Armed Services Commit-
tees in the prepar a tion pha se of the budget process 
and recommended tha t these two Committees should be 
kept informed of every step in the preperation of tha t 
docw.nent. Unification Report, £1~· cit., p 50. 
The selection of a dministrators , the organization of 
a consulta tive group, and the establishment of a program 
are Executive responsibilities. The deficiency in these 
areas points up the f a ilure of Executive leadership during 
the period. The Armed Services Comrnlttees simply did not 
have confidence in the administration's program in many 
areas, and their attitudes were a reflection of the entire 
Congress. On the question of UMT, where the Corami ttees 
did back the Executive, they were re}mdiated by the 
remainder of Congress. 
Vfuo should provide Executive leadership in the admin-
istration? In 19Lb? the Department oj~ the Army a ttempted 
to tell the country the story of UJ'vlT.. Immediately a hue 
and cry was raised by Congress e.nd other interested 
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persons against the Army's a ttempt to influence legisla-
tion.4 Obviously the leadership cannot come from the Army 
since the matters are political. By tradition, our mili-
tary services are forbidden to attempt political leadership. 
In that field, civil officials must bear the responsibility. 
The search for leadership, then, comes to the political 
center of the Executive Branch of the Government, the 
President. Congress' repudiation of t he administration's 
4. The matter was made the subject of a Congressional 
investigation and caused unfavorable comment by such 
observers e. s Svvisher. Swisher, ~?.ll· cit., p 21?. 
progr am wa s a repudia tion of the Pre s ident and his defense 
progr am. This wa s indica ted during t he B-36 hearings. 
The House Ar med Services Committee put itself clearly on 
record a s opposing the budgeta r y appr oa ch to de f ense. 5 
If one fact can be deduced from t his study it is the 
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need f or strong Presidential leaders~ip in national defense. 
In t he a bsence of such leadership Con~ittees of Congress 
may a ttempt to fill the gap. As per :::evering and wise a s 
t h ese men may be, this t a s k is beyon6. their ca.pabili t i es. 
The Congressional organization is no t suited to the devel-
opment of a nat i ona l defense progr am.. I t l a cks both the 
capacity for detailed pl anning and the ability to exert 
coordina t ing cont rol. I t is t he ConGressional t ask to 
modify and a dapt progr ams, not initiate them. 6 If an 
admi nistra tion is wise it will give t h e Ar med Servic e s 
Comraitt ees the opportunity to advise and sugges t , either 
t hrough f ormal organization or informal consulta tion. 
5. The Congressmen , during t he hearings, a tt acke d t he 
con cept of putting a budgetary l:Lnli t on nation 1 
de f ense. See B- 36 Hearings, £Q· cit., p544 . Although 
the matter cannot be defin itely determined i n this 
s tudy, t he repudia tion of executive leadershi p ma y 
stem f rom unwarranted interferen~~ e by t he Bureau of 
the Budget i n matters that a re p:roperly militar y 
decisions . See Forrestal, ££• ~it., p429 f f for an 
example of Budget Bureau authoritari anism in an area 
not anticipa t ed by law. 
6. Vandenberg , £e_. cit., p325, for ::m opinion to this 
effect in the f ield of forei gn rel ations. 
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The task of proposing the entire program, however, necessar-
ily must remain an Executive function . 
Lack of leadership has been the crux of the matter. 
The distrust of' the Executive and the military, the prefer-
ence for the volunteer services with t he resulting unbal-
ances of the defense program, and th1~ failure to control 
the lobbies in the UMT matter, are all indications of the 
failure of' E:x:ecuti ve leadership in d1~veloping a defense 
program . The reasons for that failu:re lie outside the 
scope of this study. 
APPENDIX I 
PERSONl\IEL OF THE ARMED SERVIC:ES cmliMITTEES 
A. SENATE REPUBLICAN .. !.EMBERS 
Congress 
79th 80th Slst 82nd 
Gurney M c X: 
Bridges M X X: X 
Robertson N X 
Wi~son M X 
Saltonstall N :X: :X: X 
Morse N X X X . 
Baldwin :X: 
Knowland 2 X X 
Cain :X: 
Flanders :X: 
Key: C - Chairman of Committee. 
:x: - Member of Committee. 
Not a member of Committee. 
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M - Military Affairs Committee before reorganization. 
N-- Naval Af'f'airs Committee belf'ore reorganization. 
1. Resigned in 1950. 
2. On a special committee investigating the National 
Defense Program in 1946. 
B. SENATE DEMOCRATIC ,v1EMBERS 
Congress 
?9th 80th 8lst 82nd 
Tydings N X ., oJ 
Russell N X :I!: c 
Byrd N X :I!: 
Hill M X 
Kilgore M X ... 
May bank M X 
Chapman X: 
-
J'ohnson, Lyndon 3 X: X 
Kef'auver X X 
Hunt :X: X 
Stennis X 
Long X 
3. In House on Naval Af'f'airs Commit t ee and then Armed 
Services Committee until 1949. 
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C. HOUSE REPUBLICAN 1u::MBERS 
Andrews 
Short 
Arends 
Cole 
Clason 
Thomas 
Bates 
Shafer 
Hess 
Elston 
Anderson 
Blackney 
Smith, Margaret 
Johnson, Leroy 
To we 
Bishop 
Gavin 
Norblad 
Van Zandt 
Patterson 
Cunningham 
Bates 
Nelson 
79th 
M 
M 
M 
N 
M 
M 
N 
M 
N 
M 
N 
N 
N 
M 
N 
N 
Congre:::s 
80th 
c 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
:X: 
X 
:X: 
X 
X 
X 
X 
:X: 
X 
X 
8lst 
:: ~ 
::c 
::c 
:t 
:x: 
X: 
X: 
X: 
X: 
:X: 
X: 
X: 
X: 
.. 
I 
82nd 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
:X: 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
-------------------------------------------------------1. Lost his seat after 1949 session . 
2. Killed after 1949 session. Re:pls.ced by his son in 
next Congress. 
3. Not elected to Slst Congress. Took precedence after 
Mr. Bates in 82nd Congress. 
4. Replaced in 1952 by 1tt. Nelson. 
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D. HOUSE Dl!:MOCRATIC ~ .. EMBERS 
CongreJss 
?9th 80th f ,lst 82nd 
Vinson N X c c 
Drewry N X 
Thomason M X 
Brooks M X :X: X 
Johnson, Lyndon N X ... 
Kilday M X X X 
Durham M X X X 
Sassecer N X X X 
Heffernan N X X X 
Rivers N X X X 
Sikes M X 
Philbin M X X X 
Hebert N X X X 
Winstead M X X X 
Havenner X X 
Price M X X 
Fisher X X 
Hardy X X 
Green ... X X 
Doyle X X 
deGra:f':f'enried :X: X 
Walsh 
-
X 
Clemente X X 
Wickersham :X: 
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ABSTRACT 
The Constitution of the United States :pl aces the 
res:ponsibili ty of :providing an Army a:1d Navy on Congress. 
To fulfill this responsibility Congre3s a ssigns a number 
of mi ssions to the Armed Services Com;ni ttees. 
In carrying out their assigned t .:tsks the Armed Ser-
vices Committees of the Senate and Ho·lse are forced to 
rely on members who have been chosen, l a.r gely on the basis 
of seniority, by the two major :poli ti ,3al :parties. In 
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spite of the oft noted weaknesses of t his s ystem the legis-
l a tors a ssigned to the two Armed ServLces Committees have 
been a capable group and they have be3n supported by a 
capable staff. 
The Armed Services Committees ha'iTe been able to secure 
the informa tion they need in their o:p3rations, but they 
have experienced difficulties in tyin.s together their 
numerous independent decisions. In a1idi tion, the Congres-
sional structure makes it difficult f ,)r the Armed Ser vices 
Committees, :particularly in the House, to insure the 
i mplementation of their decisions. A.3 steps in solving 
this dif'f'icul ty, the House ha s organi :~ed a Policy Subcom-
mittee within the Armed Services CommLttee and the Senate 
mainta ins a Preparedness Subcommittee. 
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Key individuals during the period under discussion 
have included the Chairmen of the Committees. Representa-
tives Andrews and Vinson led the Hou:: ~e Committee during 
the years 194'7 to 1953, while, in tho Senate, the leader-
ship passed from Senator Gurney to S f: mator Tydings and 
then to Senator Russell. Other impo:t ~tant legislators 
were Representatives Brooks, Kilday, Sassecer, Durham, 
Short, Arends, Cole and Shafer, and nenators Byrd, Bridges, 
Lyndon Johnson, Saltonstall and Knowl and. 
The Committees have been motiva;ed in their decisions 
by their desire to secure economy an(l efficiency. Unfor-
tunately, negative influences, caused by fear of militarism 
and distrust of' the Executive Branch 1 have presented 
obstacles. 
In the 194'7 unification of the . ~rmed Forces the Senate 
Armed Services Committee set its sights on the above objec-
tives but sharply limited the powers of' the Secretary of 
Defense due to the negative influenc Hs. In 1949 the same 
influences were responsible for the r estriction of the 
powers of' the Secretary of Defense a:.1d, in addition, 
caused sharp limitations in the acti ,dties of the new 
Chairman of the Joint Chief's of Staf:i ~. The desire for 
economy did result in a reorganized hudget system for the 
Armed Forces. Analysis of' the Depari;ment of Defense in 1953 
indicated that the restrictions on aut hority of the 
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Secretary of Defense and Chairman of' the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff were interfering with efficient operations and caused 
certain changes to be made. 
In the 1950 Army Organization .A.ct the antipathy of the 
legislators toward the "general staf'f" concept was pro-
nounced. During the hearings, it became apparent that 
part of this dislike was a result of' lack of understanding 
of the concept. Refusal to grant sweeping authority to 
the Secretary of the Army in time of' peace, was also 
apparent in this legislation. 
In the Armed Forces Reserve Act. of 1951 the legislators 
attempted to secure an adequate economical defense without 
the danger of militarism associated with large active duty 
military forces. Once again the ·11- itation of Executive 
authority was apparent in the legisl 9.tion. 
In Congressional consideration of the Armed Forces a 
distinct preference for the Navy, Marines, and Air Force 
over the Army is apparent. This largely stems from the 
ability of those services to secure manpower through vol-
untary enlistment. 
This feeling was demonstrated in the drive to protect 
the Marines in the 1947 and 1949 unification bills. It was 
particularly noticeable when a minirn.ll.m. level was set for 
the Corps and the Commandant of the Marine Corps was placed 
on the Joint Chiefs of- Staff for certain matters. These 
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two decisions were made in the face of' united administra-
tion opposition. 
In addition, the Congressmen engaged in eff.'orts to 
secure the enlargement of the Air Fo:: :-c e to 70 groups. In 
both 1948 and 1949 the administration recommended a smaller 
Air Force and was overridden by Cong:: :-ess, which was led, 
in large part, by the members of the Armed Services Com-
mittees. A f.'urther indication of th:Ls feeling was the 
comparatively lenient treatment rece:Lved by the .Air Force 
during the hearings on the A~r Force Organization Act of 
1951. 
The Congressmen assisted the Na·try in the Unification 
Act of 1947 but showed their concern over that service 
during the 1949 ,B-36 hearings. The ~ntire hearings were 
based on efforts to insure proper tr, ~atment for the Navy . 
The basis for the legislators' . :~.tti tudes has been 
rooted in public opinion. The effec · ~s of their attitudes 
have included inefficiency, particul:trly in the area of 
manpower utilization. 
Four major lobbies, business, l ::tbor, veterans, and 
f'armers, exist in this country. In .:1ddi tion, a number of' 
semi-professional organizations display interest in military 
organization matters. These groups 3how their interest by 
spreading the group viewpoint, testifying bef.'ore Congress, 
and attempting to help or hinder legislators who .have been 
their friends or opponents. The Air F'orce Association, a 
semi-professional group, illustrates these functions 
through its many activities. 
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Lobbies have been primarily interested in the manpower 
procurement pha se of military organiL::a tion. The efforts of 
the administration to obtain Uni vers t=1l Military Tra ining 
have aroused a great dea l of interest among the lobbies. 
Of the major lobbies only the veterar1s groups have consist-
ently f avored the proposal. The farn.ers groups have been 
especially strong in th~ir oppositior... 
In 1951, ·when the situa tion wa s s erious in Korea , the 
a dministration was successful in obtLining authorization 
f or ill/IT, subject to Congressional approval of an i mplement-
ing plan. The hearings on this bill showed the quick f or-
getfulness of the public. Tne labor groups ba cked the 
bill until the situa tion WP s partiall y ste.bilized in Korea , 
and then changed their minds and oppc1sed the measure. In 
1952 the implement ing pl an wa s rej ec · ;ed by the Hous e of 
Representa tives when all the major l obbies except the 
veterans groups opposed the measure. 
The examine.t ion of the lobbies nnd the IDilT question 
led me to the conclusion tha t the lo->bies were responsible 
for the f a.ilure to secure UMT legisln·bion. The impact of 
lobbies ha s affected Congress a s a whole, although it 
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had little effect on the Armed Serviees Committees. 
The theme that runs through the entire thesis is the 
f'ailure of' the Congress to accept tho administration's 
program. This is due in part to perBonality conf'licts 
and organizational difficulties, but is mainly chargeable 
to lack of executive leadership. Th::.s leadership cannot 
come from the military profession but is a political 
responsibility of the President. 
